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Strip Search in Pennsylvania Public
Schools
Boards of Education ...have, of course, important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous pro-
tection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.'
I. Introduction
At first blush, the idea of strip search in the public schools may
"shock the conscience."' 2 Public school officials in Auburn, New
York strip-searched the entire fifth grade after a student alleged that
three dollars had been stolen from his pocket.' In Highland, Indiana,
officials stripped a thirteen year old girl after a trained dog indicated
she had drugs on her person. In fact her own dog was in heat, and
this triggered the search dog's response. Strip searches of students
by public school officials are an unpleasant, though perhaps neces-
sary, reality. Charged with maintaining a safe learning environ-
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding
public school compulsory flag salute unconstitutional).
2. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The majority used this phrase to
describe police using a stomach-pump to retrieve swallowed evidence. "[T]his course of pro-
ceedings by agents of the government is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." Id.
Though Rochin is a due process case, the "shocks the conscience" standard is applicable to
some unreasonable searches. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 578 (1979) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting), Justice Marshall used the phrase to describe routine strip searches of prisoners after
contact visits. See also W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 18.1
(1984).
3. Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
4. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 631 F.2d 91 (7th
Cir. 1980), reh. denied, 635 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1980).
5. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
6. The term "strip search" is often used without explicit definition. In Blackburn v.
Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (Ist Cir. 1985), a prison visitor strip search case, the court distinguished
strip searches from body cavity searches:
A "strip search," though an umbrella term, generally refers to an inspection of a
naked individual, without any scrutiny of the subject's body cavities. A "visual
body cavity search" extends to visual inspection of the anal and genital areas. A
ment, some educators claim they must have this powerful tool to aid
them in their battle against drugs and violence.7 In order to forestall
abuses, and to give notice to teachers, students and parents, school
boards should establish written policies regulating when and how
school officials should conduct strip searches.8
This comment first examines the constitutional standards for
strip searches of students by public school officials.9 It then analyzes
the impact of these standards on Pennsylvania courts and schools.
The recent personal search policy implemented in Ephrata, Pennsyl-
vania, which includes strip search guidelines, will receive special at-
tention. In addition, the comment will look ahead to those issues that
Pennsylvania courts will probably address in the future, including
whether the exclusionary rule and other remedies are available when
school searches violate students' rights. The comment proposes that
a search warrant issued upon probable cause should precede a strip
search of a school student.10 This warrant should be waived only in
special cases, such as those involving real and imminent peril. Al-
though these constitutional safeguards are not required for less in-
trusive searches by public school officials," strip search is an ex-
traordinary invasion of privacy.
"manual body cavity search" includes some degree of touching or probing body
cavities.
Id. at 561 n.3. This comment uses the term "strip search" to describe the removal of all or
substantially all of the student's clothing, a definition similar to that used in the Ephrata Area
School District Personal Search Policy, which is set forth in its entirety in the Appendix.
7. Telephone interview with Dr. Edward Phillips, School Superintendent, Cornwall-
Lebanon, Pa. (Sept. 23, 1985); telephone interview with Dr. Theodore Soistmann, Jr., School
Superintendent, Ephrata, Pa. (Sept. 24, 1985).
& Most courts make little or no distinction between teachers and administrators for
purposes of fourth amendment analysis. This comment uses "public school officials" to refer to
both groups. A cautionary note: uniformed school security guards whose sole function is to
enforce regulations might be deemed law enforcement officials. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §
7-778 (Purdon 1962).
9.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no War-
rants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Probable cause to search means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowl-
edge and any other reasonably trustworthy information which would be sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband would be found in a particular place.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). At present, only Louisiana requires a
warrant issued upon probable cause for a school official to conduct any personal search. State
v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 309 (1975), on remand, 330 So.2d 900
(La. 1976).
11. Courts usually require probable cause when police participate in a school search.
See, e.g., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp.
1214 (N.D. II. 1976); Potts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1973); M.J. v. State, 399
So.2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
II. Constitutional Standards for Strip Search in Public Schools
A. The Standards Before New Jersey v. T.L.O."
In Bellnier v. Lund,18 the case in which five school officials look-
ing for three dollars stripped the entire fifth-grade class, the court
held that the search violated the students' constitutional rights.14 Of-
ficials had first searched the students' coats, and then their pockets
and shoes. When this failed, they led the boys and girls to their re-
spective lavatories and stripped them to their underwear. The strip
search lasted about fifteen minutes and did not uncover the three
dollars. The court found the search unreasonable because of the ab-
sence of individualized suspicion,15 the age of the students and the
relative triviality of the offense."6 The court, however, did not rule
out strip search under all circumstances. A strip search for drugs
based on particularized, reasonable suspicion would be permissible.1"
In the renowned case of Doe v. Renfrow,'8 school officials and
police officers in Highland, Indiana used trained dogs to make a
dragnet search for drugs throughout the public schools.1 9 Officials
required students to remain seated while trained drug-detection dogs
sniffed each student. If a dog gave a positive reaction, which suppos-
edly indicated drug possession, the officials made a pocket-and-purse
search. If the dog continued to react after this initial search, officials
made a more extensive search of the student's clothing. In the plain-
tiff's case, the drug dog continued to react even after her clothing
was searched. Unaware that her dog at home was in heat, officials
escorted the girl to the nurse's office. There two female officials 0
12. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
13. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Id. at 54.
15.
It is entirely possible that there was reasonable suspicion, and even probable
cause, based upon the facts, to believe that someone in the classroom had posses-
sion of the stolen money. There were no facts, however, which allowed the offi-
cials to particularize with respect to which students might possess the money
Id. Exceptions to the requirement of individual suspicion generally involve minimal invasions
of privacy. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.8.
16. Bellnier, 438 F. Supp. at 54.
17. id.
18. 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 631 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1980).
19. Dog-sniff searches in the schools present special circumstances which are beyond
the scope of this comment. See Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 677 F.2d 471
(5th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980);
Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom - Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope,
74 Nw. U.L. REV. 803 (1980); Comment, Searches by Drug Detection Dogs in Pennsylvania
Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 85 DICK. L. REV. 143 (1980); Note, Search and
Seizure in Public Schools: Are Our Children's Rights Going to the Dogs?, 24 ST. Louis U.LJ.
119 (1979).
20. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1017. The opinion does not identify the searchers' official
made her remove all her clothes and even lifted her hair to inspect
underneath it. They did not find any contraband.
The district court concluded that the initial dog-sniff was not a
"search" subject to fourth amendment constraints.21 The court al-
lowed the pocket-and-purse search because the drug dog's reaction
gave officials sufficient suspicion for this intrusion.22 It nonetheless
found the strip search unreasonable because the dog's reaction alone
did not give adequate cause for such an extreme invasion of the
young girl's privacy.23 In dicta, the court added that if the dog's re-
action was coupled with additional evidence, there could be cause to
conduct a warrantless strip search. 4
The strip search of a seventeen year old male high school stu-
dent described in People v. Scott D.25 presents a different question
than Renfrow. The outcome in Scott D. depended on the absence of
reasonable cause at the outset, rather than the intrusiveness of the
subsequent strip search. Twice in one hour a teacher saw Scott and
another student enter a lavatory and then leave within seconds.
School officials had been observing Scott for six months, but his only
suspicious movement on record was one cafeteria lunch with a sus-
pected student drug dealer. After the teacher reported the successive
visits to the lavatory, the principal and the dean made a wallet
search and found thirteen envelopes of white powder. They pro-
ceeded to strip search Scott, and found a vial with nine pills. The
New York Court of Appeals held the initial wallet search unreasona-
ble, 6 excluded the evidence uncovered by both searches and dis-
capacities in the school.
21. Id. at 1019. The court reasoned that the dog acted as a mere aide to school admin-
istrators in detecting the scent of marijuana. The student did not have a justifiable expectation
of privacy in the "air around the desk." Id. at 1022. The presence of a police officer in the
room at the request of the school official and with the agreement that no arrests would occur
did not alter the basic educational function of the school official. "It cannot be denied that
each of the school administrators possessed the authority to enter a classroom . . . in order to
prevent the use of illicit drugs." Id. at 1020. Other courts and commentators have been very
critical of this reasoning. See supra note 19.
22. Id. at 1024.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1026.
25. 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
26. Id. at 490, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 407. "[C]ontact among students in
the school would be so likely and so susceptible of innocent explanation . . . .Quite different
would have been accumulated instances of concentrated association with students suspected or
known to be involved in drug use or distribution." Id. at 490, 315 N.E.2d at 470, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 409.
Furtive gestures and supposedly suspicious movements may sometimes be enough to give
reasonable suspicion for a search. Compare State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1979) (search upheld because students quickly hid some-
thing on principal's approach) and State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971)
(principal found student, whom he "knew" to have used drugs in past, in hall without pass;
tussle over student's coat gave principal cause to search the coat) with Bilbrey v. Brown, 738
F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (bus driver reporting that students exchanged something on play-
missed the complaint."' The court noted, however, that had the wal-
let search been permissible, the subsequent strip search would have
been reasonable. 8
Although the courts found the strip searches unreasonable in
the three examples above, each court stated that a warrantless strip
search of a public school student might be reasonable and appropri-
ate in a different situation. The result in each case turned on the
exact facts before the court. The court first inquired whether the
search was reasonable at its inception and then whether it was rea-
sonable in its intrusiveness and duration. The line between inade-
quate suspicion and cause sufficient to instigate a search can be a
slender one. A search that is reasonable at its inception may become
unreasonable in scope if it grows too intrusive. As the circumstances
change the balance shifts between the government's need to search
and the invasion of privacy which the search entails.29
In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,80 the United States Supreme Court
adopted this balance test as the proper measure for evaluating
searches of students by public school officials. 81 Earlier Supreme
Court cases32 acknowledged that students do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate."" Nevertheless, consti-
tutional protections have been diluted to accommodate the problems
of discipline in a compulsory education system. In T.L.O., the United
States Supreme Court provided some uniformity amidst the diver-
gent lower court school search decisions."
These pre-T.L.O state and federal cases fall into several catego-
ries.85 The early view held that school officials stand in loco paren-
tiss6 to students. A search performed without police involvement con-
ground did not give cause for strip search).
27. Scott D,. 34 N.Y.2d at 491, 315 N.E.2d at 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
.28. Id. at 490, 315 N.E.2d at 470-71, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
29. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
30. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
31. See id. at 741. See also infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853 (1982); Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
34. This divergence has attracted much analysis. See generally Buss, The Fourth
Amendment and Searches of Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REV. 739 (1974); Frels, Search and
Seizure in Public Schools, 11 Hous. L.REv. 876 (1974); Phay & Rogister, Searches of Stu-
dents and the Fourth Amendment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 57 (1976); Trosch, Williams, and DeVore,
Public School Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 41 (1982); Comment,
Students and the Fourth Amendment: Myth or Reality?, 46 UMKC L. REV. 282 (1977);
Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment: "The Torturable Class," 16 U.C.D. L. REV.
709; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973).
35. See T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 738 n.2.
36. Black's Law Dictionary 708 (5th ed. 1979) defines "in loco parentis" as follows:
"In the place of the parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights,
stitutes private rather than governmental action. Therefore, the
fourth amendment does not apply.87 Although many courts"8 and
commentators 9 have criticized this analysis, some jurisdictions, in-
cluding Pennsylvania, did not abandon the in loco parentis rationale
before T.L.O."°
The Louisiana Supreme Court is alone in its view that fourth
amendment rights remain undiluted in the school. In State v.
Mora,4 1 the court declared on independent state grounds that proba-
ble cause and a warrant are necessary for school searches. Most
other courts have not found this view persuasive.
The majority of state and federal courts42 takes a middle posi-
tion,4' albeit by different analytical routes. This emerging trend
makes the fourth amendment applicable to public school officials
searching in their capacity as school officials." The special needs of
the school environment allow warrantless searches of students based
on less than probable cause.
The public school presents special circumstances that demand
. . . accommodations of the usual fourth amendment require-
duties, and responsibilities." See also I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
37. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
38. See infra note 43.
39. See supra note 34. See also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974);
R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970).
California and New York courts no longer rely on the In loco parentis rationale to find no
state action. Compare In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970) and In re
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509. 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969) with In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d
777, 105 Cal. Rtpr. 775 (1973). Compare People v. Stewart, 63 Misc.2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d
253 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) with People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974). See also infra note 48.
41. 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So.2d
900 (La. 1976).
42. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738
F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Jones v. Latexo Independent School Dist.,
499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); M. v.
Bd. of Educ. Ball-Chatham Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. I11.
1977); Gordon J. v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App.3d 542, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1984); In re W., 29 Cal. App.3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1039 (1979); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N.W.2d 180 (1975); Doe v.
State, 88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d
466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 559 P.2d 781 (1977); In
re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
43. See T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 739 n.2.
44. Courts differ over the consequences of a search by a school official which violates
the fourth amendment. Compare D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) and
State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975) (exclusionary rule does not apply) with
Gordon J. v. Santa Ana Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App.3d 542, 208 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1984)
and People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974) (exclusion-
ary rule forbids use of evidence in a criminal proceeding). See also In re L.L., 90 Wis. 2d 585,
280 N.W.2d 343 (1979) (exclusionary rule should apply).
ments. When society requires large groups of students, too
young to be considered capable of mature restraint in their use
of illegal substances or dangerous instrumentalities, it assumes a
duty to protect them from dangers posed by anti-social activities
- their own and those of other students - and to provide them
with an environment in which education is possible. To fulfill
that duty, teachers and school administrators must have broad
supervisory and disciplinary powers. 5
The diluted fourth amendment standard is appropriate unless the po-
lice are involved in the search" or the search is especially intrusive. 7
Courts offer a variety of rationales to explain the conclusion
that "reasonable suspicion" is the appropriate standard. All employ
some form of balancing test that weighs the student's privacy inter-
est against the government's need to search. One approach uses in
loco parentis as a catchphrase to embody the special authority of
school officials to maintain an effective learning environment. 8 In
the balance, this in loco parentis power acts as a counterweight to
the student's expectation of privacy, which yields the "reasonable
suspicion" standard."
Another approach emphasizes the administrative purpose of a
school search, as opposed to the law enforcement purpose of a police
search.50 The school official's task is to maintain a safe learning envi-
ronment rather than to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.
45. Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
46. See supra note II.
47. See, e.g., M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979).
48. See, e.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v. Young,
234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975).
49. The essence of the criticism of the in loco parentis rationale is that a parent looks
after the child's best interests while the school official protects the school community's interest.
When these interests collide, as they presumably do in an intrusive personal search that may
result in criminal prosecution, the school official and the parent do not have identical concerns.
See, e.g., Comment, Search and Seizure - School Officials' Authority to Search Students is
Augmented by the In Loco Parentis Doctrine, 5 FLA. ST. U1. RaV. 526 (1977); Note, In Loco
Parentis: Definition, Application and Implication, 23 S.C.L. REV. 114 (1971).
50. See, e.g., State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
The high school principal is not a law enforcement officer. His job does not
concern the discovery and prevention of crime. His duty as the chief administra-
tor of the high school includes a primary duty of maintaining order and disci-
pline in the school. In carrying out this duty, he should not be held to the same
probable cause standard as law enforcement officers. Although a student's right
to be free from intrusion is not to be lightly disregarded, for us to hold school
officials to the standard of probable cause required of law enforcement officials
would create an unreasonable burden upon these school officials. Maintaining
discipline in schools oftentimes requires immediate action and cannot await the
procurement of a search warrant based on probable cause. We hold that the
search of a student's person is reasonable and does not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights, if the school official has reasonable grounds to believe the
search is necessary in the aid of maintaining school discipline and order.
Id. at 81, 558 P.2d at 784.
The administrative objective at the outset of the search allows a
lower level of suspicion than probable cause. This analysis has its
roots in Camara v. Municipal Court."1 In that landmark case, the
United States Supreme Court allowed area-wide home inspections
by municipal officials without individualized suspicion that a housing
code violation exists.53 The Court announced a balancing test to de-
termine the reasonableness of the administrative search under which
courts must weigh the government's need to search against the inva-
sion of privacy the search entails.58
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is drawn from Terry v.
Ohio." The Terry Court invoked the Camara balancing test and up-
held a short, warrantless pat-down search based on the reasonable
suspicion of an experienced policeman. 8 Both Camara and Terry
involved relatively limited invasions of privacy. The prevailing stan-
dard for school searches is a marriage of Camara and Terry that
allows intrusive personal searches without a warrant and without
probable cause.5 The court in Bellnier v. Lund best articulates this
"reasonable suspicion" standard:
There must be demonstrated the existence of some articulable
facts which together provided reasonable grounds to search the
students, and that the search must have been in furtherance of a
legitimate purpose with respect to which school officials are em-
powered to act, such as the maintenance of discipline or the de-
tection or punishment of misconduct.58
Bellnier enumerates specific factors to be weighed in determining the
reasonableness of any search.5 These factors include the student's
51. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
52. See id. at 536-37.
53. Id.
54. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
55. "And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant the intrusion." Id. at 21.
56. A strip search of a student on much less than probable cause may not pass consti-
tutional muster. See, e.g., M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979). Courts, however, have
adopted a "reasonable suspicion" standard for strip searches of some nonincarcerated individu-
als. See, e.g., Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82 v. Carey, 737 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion to strip search prison guards and probable
cause and warrant to conduct body cavity searches of prison guards); Mary Beth G. v. City of
Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring reasonable suspicion to strip search misde-
meanor arrestees confined while awaiting bail money); United States v. Afanador, 567 F.2d
1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (border officials strip-search stewardess based on tip); United States v.
Kallevig, 534 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1976) (border strip search); Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506
Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985) (upheld strip search of prison visitor based on anonymous tele-
phone tip that visitor was smuggling drugs).
57. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
58. Id. at 53.
59. See also People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403
(1974).
age, sex and school record; the seriousness and prevalence of the
problem to which the search is directed; and the exigency requiring
an immediate warrantless search."
Although the analytical models may differ, the clear lesson from
the majority trend is that reasonable suspicion under the circum-
stances is necessary in order for a school official to conduct a war-
rantless search. Thus, the fourth amendment does give public school
students some protection from unreasonable searches. The minimal
requirement that suspicion be based on articulable facts6 bars the
patently arbitrary search. 2 In some circumstances, it may be diffi-
cult to draw the line between the search based on a mere hunch and
one based on reasonable suspicion. The essence of the Supreme
Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.8 is the proper placement of
that line. The Court found that the New Jersey Supreme Court had
drawn too constricting a line. 4 T.L.O.'s central message is that the
"reasonable suspicion" standard allows school officials broad flexibil-
ity in conducting personal searches to find evidence that the student
is violating the law or the rules of the school."
B. New Jersey v. T.L.O."
1. The Case.-In Piscataway High School on March 7, 1980,
a teacher discovered Terry Lee Owens6 7 and another girl smoking
cigarettes in the lavatory, which was not an area designated for
smoking in the school. 8 The teacher escorted both girls to the princi-
pal's office where assistant vice principal Theodore Choplick ques-
tioned them. Owens' companion admitted violating the rule against
smoking in the bathrooms and was ordered to attend a smoking
clinic for three days. 69 Owens denied she had been smoking and
60. Belinier, 438 F. Supp. at 53.
61. See id.
62. It may not require much to satisfy this requirement. See supra note 26.
63. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
64. See id. at 745.
65. See id. at 744. Such broad discretion and flexibility should not extend to strip
search. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
66. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). See generally Bartlett, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Not an End to
School Search Litigation or Commentaries, 23 Educ. L. Rptr. 801 (1985); Reamey, New
Jersey v. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court's Lesson on School Search Cases, 16 ST. MARY'S LJ.
933 (1985); Strope & Dunaway, Search and Seizure in the Public Schools: The Supreme
Court Finally Speaks!, 22 Educ. L. Rptr. 11 (1985); Stewart, And In Her Purse the Principal
Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J. 51 (1985); Ullman, After T.L.O.: Civil Liability For Failure
to Control Substance Abuse, 24 Educ. L. Rptr. 1099 (1985).
67. "T.L.O." stands for Terry Lee Owens. Stewart, And in Her Purse the Principal
Found Marijuana, 71 A.B.A. J. 51 (1985). She was fourteen years old at the time of the
search.
68. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 736.
69. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 336, 463 A.2d 934, 936 (1983).
claimed she did not smoke at all.70 Mr. Choplick brought her to his
private office and demanded to see her purse. He opened the purse,
saw a pack of cigarettes, reached in and removed it. In doing so he
saw a pack of cigarette rolling papers. Based on his knowledge that
rolling papers were closely associated with marijuana use, Mr.
Choplick conducted a thorough purse search.7 1 He found a small
amount of marijuana, a pipe, some empty plastic bags, a substantial
amount of money72 and two letters that implicated Owens in mari-
juana dealing.73 Mr. Choplick called Owens' mother and turned the
evidence over to the police. Owens' mother took her daughter to the
police station where Owens confessed to selling marijuana at
school .7  The state charged Owens with juvenile delinquency.
75
Owens moved to suppress the evidence in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, claiming the search had violated her fourth amend-
ment rights and had tainted her subsequent confession.7
The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress.77 A divided
Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's holding that there had
been no fourth amendment violation.78 The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed and ordered suppression of the evidence obtained as a
result of the search. 79 The court applied the rule that a warrantless
search by a school official is constitutional if based on "reasonable
grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity
or activity that would interfere with school discipline and order, and
the search itself is reasonable in scope." 80 The court reasoned that
possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules, nor did it
have a direct bearing on whether Owens had been smoking in the
lavatory.81 The assistant principal's desire to impeach her credibility
70. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 737. If Owens had admitted violating the rule, there would
have been no cause whatsoever to search. "The relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to
the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she
smoked supplied the necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and the infraction under
investigation." T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746.
71. Id. at 737.
72. The trial court said the purse contained approximately forty dollars in small bills.
State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 335, 428 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1980).




77. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327 (1980) (court applied a
reasonable suspicion standard and held search reasonable).
78. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982) (court agreed that
search was reasonable and remanded for a determination whether Owens' confession was
admissible).
79. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 350, 463 A.2d 934, 944 (1983). Two of seven
justices dissented. Id. at 357, 463 A.2d at 948.
80. Id. at 349, 463 A.2d at 943.
81. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942.
did not validate the search.82 Furthermore, there was no tip that
Owens had cigarettes in her purse, and so no reasonable grounds
existed to believe that the purse contained cigarettes."' At best, Mr.
Choplick had a "good hunch."84 The court therefore excluded the
evidence from criminal proceedings.8"
2. The Holding.-The state thereafter petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari. The state's petition challenged
neither the New Jersey Supreme Court's use of the "reasonable
grounds" standard nor its finding that the search was unreasonable
under that standard.a6 Instead, the appeal focused on the application
of the exclusionary rule to evidence uncovered by a school search. 87
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari8 and heard ar-
guments on the exclusionary rule issue. The Court then ordered rear-
gumenta ' on the proper standard for school searches and whether the
search of Owens had been within that standard. On reargument, the
state maintained that school officials conducting a search are not
state actors for purposes of the fourth amendment.'
The United States Supreme Court" ultimately adopted a "rea-
sonable suspicion" standard much like the one used by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Court found the search of




85. Id. at 349, 463 A.2d at 943. New Jersey's application of the exclusionary rule is
not followed in some jurisdictions. See supra note 44.
86. Brief for Petitioner at 6, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
87. See id. at 8. The state argued that the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent
effect on school officials.
88. 104 S. Ct. 480 (1984).
89. 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984). Justices Blackimun, Brennan and Stevens dissented.
This order for reargument indicates the majority's desire to rule on the application of the
fourth amendment in public schools. Because the Court ultimately found the search of Owens
reasonable, the Court never reached the exclusionary rule issue. Justice Stevens decried this
approach as improper judicial activism: "[The Court] has seized upon this 'no smoking' case to
announce 'the proper standard' that should govern searches by school officials who are con-
fronted with disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom . . . the
Court has unnecessarily and inappropriately reached out to decide a constitutional question."
T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 759 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner Upon Reargument, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985).
91. Justices Burger, O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist joined Justice White's four-part
majority opinion. Justice Blackmun joined in the judgment and agreed "with much that is
said." T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 748 (Blackmun, Jr., concurring). Justice Powell wrote a concur-
ring opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring). Justices Stevens,
Brennan and Marshall joined in Part II, which held that school officials are subject to fourth
amendment constraints. Id. at 739. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan
(in part), dissented from Parts III and IV of the majority opinion. Id. at 759 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from Parts III and IV, and
called for a probable cause standard for personal searches in the public schools. See id. at 750
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
having a "somewhat crabbed notion of reasonableness." 9
The Court held in Part II of its opinion that "in carrying out
searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such [school
disciplinary] policies, school officials act as representatives of the
state, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot
claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the fourth amend-
ment."98 Eight Justices concurred in this holding, and Justice Black-
mun apparently agreed as well. 4 There the unanimity ends.
In Part III the majority addressed the standard of reasonable-
ness governing school searches, beginning with the observation that
reasonableness is the underlying command of the fourth amend-
ment.'8 Without further discussion," the court invoked the balanc-
ing test of Camara, weighing the government need to search against
the invasion the search entails.' 7 The Court stated that this test de-
termines "the standard of reasonableness of any specific class of
searches."' 8 The Court noted that a search of a "child's person" or
closed purse or bag carried on her person" is a "severe violation."' 00
It acknowledged that the child's subjective expectation of privacy is
no less than that of an adult subjected to a similar search, and that
the child has a reasonable expectation of privacy in legitimate, non-
contraband items carried into school.1'0 On the other side of the bal-
ance is "the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in
92. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 745.
93. Id. at 741.
94. This holding effectively overrules those courts which adhere to the old view that
school searches are private action. See supra note 40.
95. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741.
96. Justice Blackmun found this approach "troubling" because it implies that the bal-
ancing test is the rule rather than the exception. He agreed that the test is appropriate because
the school environment is exceptional, but he emphasized that the Court "omits a crucial
step." T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 748-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The majority opinion fails to
explain at the outset why the school setting presents exceptional circumstances that call for the
Court to "substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." Id. at 749 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
97. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
98. In Part III of his dissent, T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Jus-
tice Brennan writes disparagingly of the Court's recent use of balancing tests to resolve fourth
amendment issues. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
All of these "balancing tests" amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction
of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed
exercise of judicial will. Perhaps this doctrinally destructive nihilism is merely a
convenient umbrella under which a majority that cannot agree on a genuine
rationale can conceal its differences.
T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 758-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 741. Owens' person was not searched. The Court's use of the
phrase "person or closed bag" suggests the majority's desire to fashion a broadly applicable
rule. See supra note 89.
100. Id. at 741-42.
101. See id. at 742.
maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds."'01
The balance results in the elimination of the warrant requirement
and a modification of the usual "probable cause" standard.10
With minimal analysis, the Court rejected the warrant require-
ment because it would be "likely to frustrate the purpose of the
search"'" and would "unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the school."' 0 5
Thus, because of the unique demands of the school setting, the Court
modified the level of suspicion needed to search.' ° The Court con-
cluded that
[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a
teacher or other school official will be "justified at its inception"
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated either
the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permis-
sible in scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in"
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.107
The Court applied this "reasonable suspicion" standard to the
facts of the case. Mr. Choplick's initial search for cigarettes was
proper because the discovery of cigarettes "would both corroborate
the report that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility
of her defense to the charge of smoking."' 08 His suspicion that there
were cigarettes in her purse was a "common-sense conclusion."'109
The competing possibility that this conclusion might be incorrect did
not make it an unreasonable assumption. "Because the hypothesis
that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse was itself not unrea-
sonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent
with the teacher's accusation."' 10 Mr. Choplick's discovery of ciga-
102. Id.
103. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
104. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. The Court relied on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). The Camara Court drew the "frustrate the purpose" test from
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). Justice Brennan agreed that the special
circumstances of the school setting call for an exception to the warrant requirement. T.L.O.,
105 S. Ct. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743. Swiftness and informality are inappropriate when a strip
search is contemplated.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 744.
108. Id. at 745. But see supra note 82 and accompanying text. Arguably, the teacher's
report of the rule violation was sufficient in itself, without any search, for Mr. Choplick to
mete out punishment. Had there been no cigarettes in the purse, Owen's credibility would not
have outweighed that of the teacher.
109. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746. But see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
110. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 746. The message here is that so long as the searcher's suspi-
cions are not unfounded, the possibility that the searcher is wrong is unimportant. Reasonable
rette rolling papers when he removed the pack of cigarettes11" ' pro-
vided reasonable suspicion for a further exploration of the purse.1 12
This deeper intrusion uncovered a pipe, some marijuana, plastic bags
and some cash.'13 These discoveries, in turn, gave cause to extend
the search to the zippered compartment of the purse, in which Mr.
Choplick found the incriminating letters.11 4 A search based initially
on reasonable yet minimal suspicion of a minor infraction escalated
into a more intrusive search for evidence of a more serious violation.
3. The Unanswered Questions.-The Court did not state
whether it would have been appropriate under the circumstances for
Mr. Choplick to conduct a strip search of Owens. The Court's con-
cern about the propriety of public school strip searches was apparent
from the repeated questions on the matter addressed to both counsel
during oral argument.110 The majority, however, did not actually
mention strip search. Clearly, T.L.O. does set limits on intrusiveness.
The measures adopted must be "reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not unnecessarily intrusive in the light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."I 6 Only
Justice Stevens, in a footnote in his dissent, makes it plain that strip
searches are inappropriate except to prevent imminent and serious
harm.11 7 In light of the Court's evident concern during argument,
strip search seems conspicuous by its absence from the majority
opinion, especially given the Court willingness to use footnotes to
clarify other aspects of the ruling.
Moreover, the court did not resolve the original question of the
applicability of the exclusionary rule."' The T.L.O. standard does
not necessarily apply to searches of desks or lockers."19 Nor does the
suspicion is that which is not unreasonable.
I1l. Id. at 746 n. 12. The Court rejects Owens' argument that it was unreasonable to
remove the cigarettes. The Court calls this contention "hairsplitting argumentation." Id.
112. But see id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would require proba-
ble cause to search, and he notes that the mere presence of cigarette rolling papers does not
give probable cause.
113. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 747.
114. Id.
115. Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 12-18, 39-40, New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
116. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744.
117. Id. at 765 n.25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "One thing is clear under any standard -
the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no place in the school house
...To the extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial
context, it surely must only be to prevent serious and imminent harm." Id.
118. Id. at 739. See also supra note 44 and infra note 160. See generally Brief of Peti-
tioner, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985); Brief of Respondent, New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
119. A lower standard may be appropriate for locker searches. See, e.g., People v. Over-
ton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); In re A.B.C., 50 Pa. D. &
C.2d 115 (1970).
standard apply when "assessing the legality of searches conducted by
school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforce-
ment agencies. '12 0 The Court did not decide whether individualized
suspicion is always an essential element of the reasonableness stan-
dard, 12 1 although the Court did note that individualized suspicion
generally is required for more than minimal invasions of privacy.
1 22
T.L.O. leaves to school officials the discretion to decide which stu-
dent infractions are serious enough to justify personal searches.12 a
In sum, the T.L.O. standard applies to personal searches con-
ducted by school officials seeking evidence of violations of school
rules or criminal law. The underlying policy is to provide a practical,
flexible standard for school officials while still recognizing students'
fourth amendment rights. "By focusing attention on the question of
reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers and school adminis-
trators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of proba-
ble cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the
dictates of reason and common sense.
1 24
120. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.7. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
121. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.8. This apparently is addressed to area-wide exploratory
searches, also known as dragnets, which are minimally intrusive. The use of metal-detectors,
eavesdropping devices, two-way mirrors, or trained dogs raises questions about the usual re-
quirement of "some quantum of individualized suspicion." Id. (quoting United States v. Marti-
nez, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976)).
122. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744 n.8. The Court strongly implies that strip search requires
individualization of suspicion. "Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are
generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal." Id.
123.
The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a
judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school
order or of a proper educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the
rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a
general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distin-
guish between rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools
and rules that are not.
d. at 744 n.9. But see id. at 762-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting): "This standard will permit
teachers and school administrators to search students when they suspect that the search will
reveal evidence of even the most trivial school regulation or precatory guidelines for student
behavior."
124. Id. at 744. But see id. at 755-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasons
that probable cause is a flexible, practical and easily applied standard. Several cases support
his reasoning. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Moreover, well-settled fourth
amendment law allows brief stop-and-frisk searches to protect the school community from
imminent harm. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Justice Brennan contends in T.L.O. that the Court's "reasonableness standard" will con-
fuse rather than clarify. See T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 756-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
[T]he amorphous "reasonableness under all the circumstances" standard freshly
coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater un-
certainty among teachers and administrators . . .[A] school system faced with
interpreting what is permitted under the Court's new "reasonableness" standard
would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be permissible.
C. Public School Strip Search After T.L.O.
T.L.O. does not necessarily speak to strip search and, therefore,
courts may formulate stricter standards to govern such extreme inva-
sions of privacy. Although the United States Supreme Court casts its
rule in broad and all-encompassing terms, there is room to distin-
guish a strip search case on its facts. The search of Owens invaded
only her purse. There was much less risk of the potential humiliation
and psychological damage inherent in a public school strip search. 25
T.L.O. emphasized the need for "swift and informal disciplinary pro-
cedures . . . in the schools."1" Although swiftness and informality
may be virtues in the ordinary classroom situation, they are espe-
cially unsuitable in a strip search. An invasion of a minor's intimate
privacy should be marked by caution and formal process. 2
A stricter standard for strip search does not directly contravene
T.L.O. The Court did not mention strip search, 128 nor did it respond
to Justice Stevens assertion that such methods have no place in the
public schools. 2 Furthermore, the Camara balancing test 30 em-
ployed by the Court arguably results in a probable cause standard
for strip searches.
In M.M. v. Anker,31 the Second Circuit used a sliding scale
approach to arrive at a probable cause standard for school strip
searches. "[A]s the intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the stan-
dard of Fourth Amendment 'reasonableness' approaches probable
cause, even in the school context. Thus, when a teacher conducts a
highly intrusive invasion such as the strip search in this case, it is
reasonable to require that probable cause be present." 32 Anker is
not really at sharp variance with the standard set forth in Bellnier v.
Lund. 3 8 The Bellnier test' 4 seems to allow a warrantless strip
125. See, e.g., Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 54 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); People v. Scott
D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 490, 315 N.E.2d 466, 471, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 410 (1974).
126. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
127. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 117.
130. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
131. 477 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), afid, 607 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1979). A high
school official discovered a female student with a reputation for stealing crouched furtively in a
classroom during a fire drill. The official took the girl to the dean's office, where the dean
spilled the girl's bookbag onto the desk. The girl grabbed an item, which the dean thought was
a pipe, and tucked it into her jeans. The dean summoned female security guards who con-
ducted a strip search. The court found the bookbag search unreasonable because there was no
allegation that the girl had stolen property. The strip search was unreasonable even if the
dean's hunch was correct. "Such a search, a body search, was so inordinate in terms of the
object sought by the search, that it cannot be defended on any ground." Anker, 477 F. Supp.
at 840.
132. Anker, 607 F.2d at 589.
133. 438 F. Supp. 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
134. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
search based on less than probable cause. Nonetheless, for a school
strip search to be upheld under the Bellnier test, school officials must
actually have what amounts to probable cause.135
Courts should adopt a probable cause standard for strip
searches by public school officials. The explicit requirement that
probable cause precede a strip search does not unduly restrict school
officials, nor does it hamper maintenance of discipline. Strip search
in the public schools is an exceptional occurrence and a probable
cause standard would signal that the flexibility afforded by a lesser
standard is not appropriate for such a grave invasion of privacy.
Moreover, courts should resurrect the warrant requirement for
school strip searches. Absent exigent circumstances, a neutral magis-
trate is the proper official to make the determination that the facts
justify strip search.130 Although the exigent circumstances necessary
to justify a warrantless search are conceivable, their extraordinary
occurrence does not justify an across-the-board sanction of warrant-
less strip searches. The exception should not swallow the rule.
Requiring a warrant issued upon probable cause before a public
school strip search draws a clear line between strip search and less
intrusive means of gathering evidence. The relative intrusiveness of
different types of searches span a continuum from a brief stop-and-
frisk to a manual body cavity search. The notion of a linear sliding
scale, however, is deceptive. A strip search of a child in a public
school is a quantum leap beyond a locker or purse search. "It does
not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of
a thirteen-year-old is an invasion of some magnitude. More than
that: it is a violation of any known principle of human decency. 137
III. Strip Search in Pennsylvania Public Schools After T.L.O.
A. Statutory and Regulatory Authority
The School Code and related statutes"8' establish the general
outline under which Pennsylvania schools operate. The local school
board is empowered to "adopt and enforce such reasonable rules and
regulations as it may deem necessary and proper." 1'89 This is a broad
but not absolute grant of power. State Board of Education regula-
135. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984); Rone v. Daviess
County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W.2d 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
136. See generally Buss, supra note 34; 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 10.11, at
469-71 (1978).
137. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980).
138. The School Code and miscellaneous provisions related to schools and education ap-
pear in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 (Purdon 1962).
139. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-510 (Purdon 1962). See also Harris v. Commonwealth
Secretary of Educ., 29 Pa. Commw. 625, 372 A.2d 953 (1977) (school board has absolute
right to regulate student discipline).
tions on "Student Rights and Responsibilities"'140 require that local
school boards operate within constitutional and statutory parame-
ters.141 State regulations direct each local board to adopt "a code of
student conduct which shall include policies governing student disci-
pline and a listing of student rights and responsibilities."'4
Beyond this, the regulations give only limited guidance on
school searches. A specific standard for locker searches by school au-
thorities is set forth, 4 a but the regulations do not address personal
searches.144 The Pennsylvania Department of Education publishes
guidelines for developing a local student discipline and conduct
code.145 These guidelines are based on a four-tiered taxonomy of stu-
dent behavior, from the petty infraction to the serious violation. The
guidelines suggest appropriate responses for each level of miscon-
duct. Teachers are expected to cope with relatively minor misbehav-
ior, while serious offenses require administrators to investigate and
take appropriate action. 46 Under this scheme, the principal or assis-
tant principal would undertake most intrusive personal searches. The
guidelines include examples of personal search policies from several
school districts. ' The guidelines provide a model that local school
boards may copy or adopt.
4 8
Little guidance is offered regarding intrusive personal searches.
It remains the responsibility of the local board to establish a discipli-
nary policy that includes some regulations on school searches. It is
up to the board to structure a policy that both protects student rights
and is practical for school officials.
Like the school board, the teacher's authority arises from a leg-
islative grant of power. The teacher has "the right to exercise the
same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils . ..as
the parents ...may exercise over them.' 14 This in loco parentis
section of the School Code does not invest teachers with all the au-
140. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 12 (Shepard's 1984). This administrative regulation should
be considered in pari materia with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 5-5 10 (Purdon 1962). See Girard
School District v. Pittenger, 481 Pa. 91, 392 A.2d 261 (1978).
141. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 12.3 (Shepard's 1984).
142. Id.
143. 22 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 12.14 (Shepard's 1984).
144. See id.
145. PA. DEPT. OF EDuc., DISCIPLINE: POLICIES AND GUIDELINES (1984).
146. Id. at 4-7.
147. Id. at 39-91. The sample policies do not include strip search guidelines. They do,
however, require the administrator to call police in the event of a serious violation. Id. at 59,
69.
148. See, e.g., Girard School Dist. v. Pittenger, 481 Pa. 91, 392 A.2d 261 (1978).
"[Tlhe local school board retains discretion under the School Code to determine the nature of
the discipline to be administered, and the conditions under which it will be imposed." Id. at
100, 392 A.2d 265.
149. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1317 (Purdon 1983).
thority of parents, 150 but it does grant "such control as is necessary
to prevent infractions of discipline and interference with the educa-
tional process."' 1 Thus, a teacher's mandate to search derives from
his statutory in loco parentis standing and from local school board
policy shaped under state regulations and recommendations.
B. The Exclusionary Rule
Until T.L.O., Pennsylvania adhered to the school search stan-
dard stated in Commonwealth v. Dingfelt. 5 2 In that case, a tip from
a student led the assistant principal to conduct a pocket and shoe
search of an eighteen year old male student. The search uncovered a
bottle of capsules, and the student was charged with criminal posses-
sion of a controlled substance. The trial court suppressed the evi-
dence as illegally obtained. 53 The Superior Court reversed the order
of suppression,' 4 relying on the in loco parentis rationale155 to con-
clude that the school official had acted as a private citizen rather
than a government agent.
5 6
Although T.L.O. plainly overrules this view,15 7 and so brings
Pennsylvania school officials within the ambit of the fourth amend-
ment, 5 8 the Dingfelt search most likely would be upheld under the
T.L.O. "reasonable suspicion" standard. 59 T.L.O. does not place
much stricter limits on personal searches by Pennsylvania school offi-
cials, but it may have important effects on the consequences of an
150. See, e.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Guerreri v. Ty-
son, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).
151. Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
152. 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1974).
153. Id. at 381, 323 A.2d at 146.
154. Id. at 384, 323 A.2d at 147.
155. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. See also In Re A.B.C., 50 Pa. D. &
C.2d 115 (1970).
156. Dingfelt also holds that Miranda warnings were not required before the search
commenced. See, e.g., Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Me. 1982); People v. Shipp, 96
I1l. App.2d 364, 239 N.E.2d 296 (1968); Matter of Brendan H., 82 Misc.2d 1077, 372
N.Y.S.2d 473 (1975); In re Tracy, 14 Pa. D. & C.3d 310 (1980). It is arguable that a school
strip search constitutes a custodial interrogation because the student would not be free to
leave, and so the Miranda warning is proper. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 346 (1966).
157. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Alinovi v. Worcester School
Comm., 766 F.2d 660 (1st Cir. 1985) (indisputable after T.L.O. that fourth amendment ap-
plies to public school searches).
158. See supra note 9. The fourth amendment applies to the states by virtue of the
fourteenth amendment:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. The search was reasonable at the outset because the assistant principal had reason-
able suspicion, based on a tip, that the search would uncover evidence of drug possession. The
pocket-and-shoe search was reasonable in scope, given the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.
unconstitutional search. While the Dingfelt rule did not condone ille-
gal searches, it allowed the admission of evidence unlawfully seized
by a school official. Thus, the real impact of T.L.O. in Pennsylvania
is that it declares school searches to be state action for fourth
amendment purposes. This allows the victim of an unlawful school
search to seek meaningful remedies, such as the application of the
exclusionary rule 60 and damages in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.1 The in loco parentis rationale no longer blocks access to
these remedies. Nonetheless, other roadblocks not addressed by
T.L.O. may still prevent the victim from achieving redress.
Courts have split over whether the exclusionary rule is an ap-
propriate remedy for fourth amendment violations committed by
public school officials. One view is that the primary purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter illegal searches by law enforcement offi-
cials, and that applying the rule to school officials does not serve that
purpose. 1" Although school officials may search frequently enough
to understand the rule, they do not have a substantial interest in
obtaining criminal convictions.168 Their purpose is to maintain school
discipline and order. Thus, they decide to search without reference to
the likelihood of criminal prosecution. The exclusionary rule would
not inhibit unlawful school searches because of the administrative
purpose at the outset of the search.1" This view emphasizes the
school official's intent at the inception of the search, while the oppos-
ing view focuses on the resulting criminal proceeding that relies on
illegally seized evidence.
Courts that apply the exclusionary rule to illegal school
searches165 stress fairness to the victim 66 and judicial integrity.167
160. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use in criminal proceedings of evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (ap-
plying exclusionary rule to federal proceedings); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (ex-
tending exclusionary rule to state proceedings).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the Dis-
trict of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me. 1969); D.R.C. v. State,
646 P.2d 252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); State v. Young, 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E.2d 586 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975); Brief of Petitioner at 7-20, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985).
163. D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 258 n.10 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
164. See supra notes 50-53, 107 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 759 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones
v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); State v. Mora, 307 So.2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 309
The United States Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule
to other administrative searches by government agents who are not
law enforcement officials."" Furthermore, not applying the rule
raises the "silver platter" problem that the Court in Mapp v. Ohio"'
had sought to correct. School officials would be able to hand over
unlawfully seized evidence to police, while the victim of the search
must resort only to civil remedies which require costly litigation and
may have little chance of success.170 Most public schools have a reg-
ular working relationship with the local police, and those police
should not be tempted to encourage unlawful searches by school
officials.
Once the evidence comes into the possession of law enforcement
officers and is used in court proceedings against the liberty inter-
ests of the person searched, the exclusionary rule must be availa-
ble to deter prosecutions based on unlawful searches. Without
such exclusion, school personnel and other government employ-
ees would become the same sort of bypass around the amend-
ment's protections that the Court meant to close by extending
the exclusionary rule to state court proceedings in Mapp v.
Ohio. 1
It is uncertain whether Pennsylvania courts will exclude evi-
dence seized in an unreasonable school strip search. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court recently stressed that the purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is to prevent police misconduct, rather than to remedy
harm caused by unconstitutional searches." 2 "Both the United
States Supreme Court and this Court have made it clear that the
exclusionary rule will not be extended to areas where its application
would not tend to achieve its primary purpose of deterring unlawful
(1975), on remand, 330 So.2d 900 (La. 1976); State ex rel. T.L.O., .94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d
934 (1983); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); In
re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
166. See, e.g. In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d 585, 597, 280 N.W.2d 343, 349 (1979).
167. Although the United States Supreme Court currently stresses the deterrence ra-
tionale for the exclusionary rule, judicial integrity, that is, the idea that a court which admits
illegally seized evidence seemingly ratifies the act and makes the court an accomplice, is still
an accepted justification for the rule. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
168. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (search of fire-damaged premises
by fire officials investigating cause of fire); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)
(searches of work areas by Occupational Safety and Health Administration officials); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless search of premises by investigators for
municipal department of health).
169. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
170. See infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
171. In re L.L., 90 Wis.2d at 591 n.l, 280 N.W.2d at 347 n.l.
172. See Commonwealth v. Corley, - Pa. -, 491 A.2d 829 (1985). See also
Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 53-73, 403 A.2d 1283, 1293-1304 (1979) (Larsen, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 477 Pa. 93, 383 A.2d
838 (1978).
police conduct." 1"7 This approach implies that the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court might choose not to apply the exclusionary rule to
school searches unless there is police participation.
The invasion of privacy, however, is so extreme in an unconsti-
tutional strip search that both judicial integrity and the goal of de-
terrence demand exclusion of the illegally seized evidence. A school
official who decides to strip search presumably is looking for evi-
dence of a very serious violation and is likely to turn any evidence
over to police. In fact, the official may be required by school policy
to inform the police. 174 If the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect is
less pronounced in the school context, the solution may be to extend
the rule to school disciplinary proceedings. 7 '
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-gov-
erning citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted
through the use of arbitrary methods destructive of personal lib-
erty, they cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with
unfairly. The application of the exclusionary rule in criminal
proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an impor-
tant statement to young people that "our society attaches serious
consequences to a violation of constitutional rights," and that
this is a principle of "liberty and justice for all."1"71
C. Civil Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
42 U.S.C. § 198317 provides victims of illegal school searches a
means to obtain money damages. So long as Pennsylvania courts
viewed school searches as private action,17 8 plaintiffs were barred
from using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual officials because of
the state action requirement in the statute.179 Moreover, school
boards, as opposed to individual school officials, are not liable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they are not "persons."' 80 Under T.L.O.,
school searches are state action, 18 and so individual school officials
now may be held liable for violations of students' constitutional
rights.
The primary obstacle that remains for the plaintiff is the "good
173. Commonwealth v. Corley, 507 Pa. 540, -, 491 A.2d 829, 835 (1985).
174. See supra note 147.
175. See, e.g., Jones v. Latexo Indep. School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980);
Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (college dormitory search).
176. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 760-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. For the text of Section 1983, see supra note 161.
178. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Potts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
180. See id. See also supra note 161.
181. See supra note 93.
faith" exception to liability established in Wood v. Strickland.1" A
school official is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only for violations of
settled principles of constitutional law. "A compensatory award will
be appropriate only if the [school official] has acted with such an
impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the students
clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot rea-
sonably be characterized as being in good faith." '188 The official has
the burden to show he is entitled to this qualified immunity.18 4 Thus,
good faith immunity will not shield the patently arbitrary search or
the search that is far too intrusive in light of the infraction. A search
on the constitutional borderline will probably not expose the school
official to liability.188 Even if the plaintiff establishes liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the absence of proof of actual injury the stu-
dent is entitled only to nominal damages.18 6 In addition, without
proof of malicious intent, the court cannot impose punitive
damages.
18 7
Although these are formidable barriers for the plaintiff, the vic-
tim of an unlawful strip search has a significant chance of success
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such an extreme intrusion places a very
heavy burden of justification on the official attempting to show good
faith. 88 Moreover, the plaintiff is more likely to be able to show ac-
tual injury because of the psychological harm associated with strip
search.189 Certainly the shocking nature of strip search is likely to
arouse the sympathies of the court. 190
D. Responsibilities of the Lower Courts
Not only does T.L.O. leave to lower courts the responsibility for
fashioning appropriate remedies for school searches, it also leaves
room for courts to establish stricter standards for strip searches by
public school officials. 9' Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts may rely
on independent state grounds'" and require stricter standards for all
182. 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (due process violations by school officials).
183. Id. at 322.
184. See, e.g. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. Even if local policy imposes more stringent standards than those required by law,
the school official will be held liable only for violations of settled constitutional law. Thus, local
policies that require probable cause to search may constrain official conduct, but they do not
broaden the scope of civil remedies. See, e.g., Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.
1984).
186. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
187. See id.
188. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1984).
189. See supra note 125.
190. See supra notes 1, 137 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Commonwealth v. Harris, 429
Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 (1968); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual
school searches under the Pennsylvania Constitution. 193 At least for
school strip searches, the Pennsylvania courts should impose a proba-
ble cause standard and require a warrant absent exigent
circumstances. 19
4
E. Responsibilities of Local School Boards
Local school boards should adopt written guidelines governing
strip searches rather than wait for circumstances to force them to
enact policies. 195 This will protect the interests of administrators,
teachers and students. School personnel have a duty to understand
the established constitutional limits on searches. A written policy
will promote this awareness. "A school official is charged with
'knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his
charges,' and therefore is immune only if he reasonably believed he
had a lawful right to take the action in question."' 196 A written policy
would also serve students by informing them of their rights while in
school.
Thus, the purpose of a written policy is not to create authority,
but to give notice. The power to search stems from statute and com-
mon law and not from the local board's policy. 1'9 7 The policy simply
makes the rules known to all in advance and hopefully helps avoid
the confrontations it anticipates. Written guidelines will not en-
courage officials to conduct strip searches. In fact, carefully drawn
policies should deter official misconduct while awakening students to
the fact that strip searches are constitutionally permissible in certain
circumstances.
The policy recently implemented in Ephrata, Pennsylvania " is
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
193.
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to
seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may
be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to
by the affiant.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
194. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text. In Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506
Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imposed a "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard for strip searches of prison visitors. The court noted that such visits are volun-
tary, and that the visitor could have left the prison rather than consent to the strip search. This
distinguishes Dugger from the public school context because school attendance is mandatory.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (Purdon 1962). In addition, a minor who responds to a
school official's demand to strip can hardly be said to consent to the search. See Jones v.
Latexo Independent School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
195. See infra note 198.
196. Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
197. See supra notes 138-51.
198. The policy appears in its entirety in the Appendix. This policy is the end result of a
lawsuit brought by Geoffrey Walters against the Ephrata High School principal and assistant
a responsible and reasonable approach to public school strip
searches. The policy allows strip searches only for drugs or weapons,
and under no circumstances may underpants be removed. Only des-
ignated administrators may conduct strip searches. The policy sets
forth a "reasonable grounds" standard that requires what amounts
to probable cause.199 School officials must inform the student of his
right to contact his parent or other interested adult, and, if possible,
that adult should be present during the search. The search must be
conducted in as discreet a manner as possible. The school official
must file a written report describing the search. This policy incorpo-
rates in-house safeguards which preserve students' constitutional
rights and promote proper official conduct. In the absence of a
stricter legal standard from the courts, this is an exemplary policy. It
is certainly much better than no policy at all.
Students, parents, and teachers alike would be well served if
school boards, after full public discussion, adopted carefully
drawn regulations defining when, where, by whom and under
what circumstances searches of students may be conducted.
Such regulations would go far in determining the community's
view of "reasonable conduct" and would stand the best chance
of reconciling the student's legitimate privacy interests with the
educational necessities of the school environment.
200
IV. Conclusion
Public school teachers and administrators find themselves
caught between competing and compelling interests when they con-
duct personal searches of students. On one side of the balance is the
school official's duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of all
the students. On the other side is the students' constitutional right to
be secure from unreasonable searches. This conflict of interests is at
its sharpest when a school official conducts a strip search to uncover
evidence of a serious violation of school regulations. The school offi-
cial is charged with protecting the interests on both sides of the bal-
ance. This is a delicate and difficult duty. It is in the best interests of
all concerned that school boards enact comprehensive personal
search policies that include strip search guidelines. In order that stu-
principal. Walters v. Snook, No. 83-3949 (E.D. Pa. Aug. II, 1983). School officials searching
for marijuana stripped Walters on May 20, 1983. They found no evidence of an infraction.
Walters brought suit, and the district court suspended the case while waiting for the United
States Supreme Court to decide T.L.O. After T.L.O., attorneys for both sides and the school
board's attorney drafted a strip search policy which was incorporated into the consent decree
that settled the suit. Walters v. Snook, No. 83-3949 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1985).
199. See infra Appendix.
200. D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 261 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
dents do not depend solely on the foresight and discretion of local
officials, courts should impose undiluted fourth amendment safe-
guards against unreasonable strip searches in the public schools.
Donald B. Kaufman
APPENDIX
Ephrata Area School District Personal Search Policy
PERSONAL SEARCH
Purpose:
The Board acknowledges that while all students are constitu-
tionally protected against unreasonable search and seizure, the need
to maintain a safe and healthy school environment may involve per-
sonal searches under the conditions set forth in this policy.
Definitions:
For the purposes of this policy the following definitions will
apply:
1. Personal search will include pat down, partial disrobing and
strip searches.
2. "Pat down search" will mean a search of the pockets and
outer clothing of a student, conducted without the removal
of any clothing. A pat down search shall include the right to
reach inside a student's jacket so that shirt and pants pock-
ets can be patted down. This term shall also include the
student emptying his or her pockets and said pockets turned
inside out.
3. "Partial disrobing search" shall mean any search in which a
student is required by a school official to remove any article
of clothing, including shoes, socks, coats, jackets, and hats,
and the inspection of those articles by school officials. Male
students can be required under such a search to remove
shirt.
4. "Strip search" shall mean the removal of all or substan-
tially all of the student's clothing pursuant to an order from
a school official. A student who is required to remove all of
his clothing except for his underpants is deemed to have
been subjected to a strip search. Further, a student who is
required to remove his clothing, but who is allowed to put
certain articles back on when other articles are removed, is
deemed to be subject to a strip search.
Authority:
The Board shall authorize the Superintendent to designate
members of the Administrative Staff to conduct personal searches
according to the guidelines set forth in this policy.
Delegation of Responsibility:
The Superintendent shall designate members of the Administra-
tive Staff to conduct personal searches governed by this policy.
The Superintendent shall develop additional procedures when
needed to implement this policy.
Guidelines:
The Board shall set forth the following guidelines relating to
student searches:
1. Prior to initiating a strip search, school administrators must
be able to articulate substantial factual evidence that pro-
vides reasonable grounds to believe the student possesses the
contraband sought. This evidence must be based on an ac-
tual visible sighting by a school official or reliable inform-
ant; or properly developed information from a reliable in-
formant. Properly developed information requires school
officials to question the informant as to how and when he
acquired the information to determine not only the reliabil-
ity of the informant but also the reliability of the tip.
2. The underpants will not be removed for any personal
search.
3. A student being subjected to a strip search shall have the
right to contact a parent or other interested adult prior to
the search being conducted. School officials shall notify the
student of this right prior to the search. If the student
chooses to exercise this right and his parent or other inter-
ested adult desires to be present, the search will be post-
poned for no longer than one hour until the parent or other
interested adult arrives. School officials shall have the right
to isolate the student during that time to ensure that no evi-
dence is disposed of. If the parent or other interested adult
is unable to appear within one hour, school officials shall
have the right to conduct the search without that individ-
ual's presence.
4. If a parent is not present during a strip search, the parent
shall be notified of the search within five business days.
5. Two school personnel of the same sex as the student shall
be present for all personal searches. No student shall be
searched by a school employee of the opposite sex. No par-
tial disrobing search or strip search shall be conducted in
the presence of a school employee of the opposite sex.
6. Following a strip search or partial disrobing search, the stu-
dent shall be allowed to dress as quickly as possible.
7. The search shall take place in a secure, private location so
that the student shall have privacy from individuals not con-
nected with the search.
8. Strip searches should only be performed when the offense
involves possession of weapons or illegal drugs.
9. If school authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that
a student is in possession of tobacco, cigarettes, pornogra-
phy, or other similar items which do not constitute serious
criminal activity nor a serious threat to the educational pro-
cess and school discipline, no search other than a pat down
search or partial disrobing search shall be conducted.
10. For each strip search conducted, a written report shall be
filed with the District Superintendent indicating:
(a) The date, place, and time of the search.
(b) Name of the student and School Officials present.
(c) An inventory of all items taken from the student.
(d) A description of the search procedure, including items
of clothing removed.
(e) A statement concerning the information which gave
reasonable cause for the search.
(f) A statement concerning whether or not the student




Homicide by Vehicle in Pennsylvania:
Irrational Punishment of the Negligent
Driver
I. Introduction
The incidence of accidental deaths on our highways is a na-
tional problem of major concern.' Through highway safety legisla-
tion, state and local governments have attempted to strengthen their
ability to solve this pervasive problem. Ideal and effective road safety
programs, however, should provide a maximum degree of highway
safety within a framework of traditional freedoms and principles of
law.2 If society assesses criminal liability against motor vehicle oper-
ators who inadvertently kill others while violating legislative provi-
sions relating to the use or operation of motor vehicles, it must do so
within traditional bounds of criminal responsibility. Where this can-
not be accomplished, operators cannot legitimately be subjected to
criminal punishment and condemnation. If justice demands that
some action be taken with respect to the negligent offender, his
wrongdoings are best redressed privately under traditional principles
of tort law.
The genesis of this argument lies in the particular nature of
American criminal law. This comment sets forth the basic principles
of criminal law on which the idea of effective criminal punishment is
premised." It then evaluates, in light of these basic principles, the
criminalization decision marked by one particular piece of highway
safety legislation, Pennsylvania's current homicide by vehicle stat-
ute. 4 The purpose of the comment is to analyze this controversial
statute in its present form,' the type of conduct it punishes, and the
1. See THE UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE foreward (National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances 1968). The Committee notes that the passage of the Highway
Safety Act in 1966 first directed national attention to this problem.
2. Id. at VII. The National Committee summarizes the philosophy of the Uniform
Vehicle Code and its motto - "Safety with Freedom through Law," "to provide every high-
way user, through law, a maximum degree of safety within the framework of traditional
freedoms."
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-28.
4. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732 (1984).
5. Section 3732, enacted in 1977, was amended in 1982 so that a separate offense for
homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance
could be established. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732 (1984) (amending 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
goals of society thought to be served by the criminalization of that
conduct. Finally, the comment evaluates the actual and potential
achievement of societal goals and makes suggestions for possible al-
ternatives or amendments to the current statute which would better
afford realization of those goals.
II. The Nature of Criminal Liability
Criminal liability has its origin in the protection of society
through the prevention' of certain highly undesirable conduct. In its
most basic sense, crime is any action labeled "crime" by a society,
and criminal penalty, or punishment,8 is simply any penalty attached
to crime. Generally speaking then, the question of what conduct to
make criminal is a policy question. The decision to impose criminal
liability upon certain conduct stems from society's recognition that
certain conduct is such an impediment to its orderly existence that
criminal sanctions are necessary to prevent that conduct. 10 Conduct
that is undesirable, the prevention of which is not essential to the
maintenance of that society, falls not within the perimeters of crimi-
nal law, but rather private law and its corresponding sanctions." In
ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977)). Homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence is a third
degree felony and carries a minimum penalty of three years of imprisonment. 75 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3735 (1984).
6. Although this comment focuses on the prevention of crime as the prevention of
certain undesirable conduct, criminal liability may also be imposed for the omission of certain
desirable conduct. As an example, where one stands in a certain status relationship with an-
other, and one fails to perform a duty imposed by law with regard to that other person, one
may be held criminally responsible for that failure to act. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d
307 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
7. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 21 (1972); Andenaes,
The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); Hart, Murder
and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 433, 449
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Murder and Its Punishment).
8. Punishment can be defined as follows:
Any fine, penalty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the
law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or offense com-
mitted by him, as for his omission of a duty enjoined by law . . . . But does not
include a civil penalty redounding to the benefit of an individual, such as a for-
feiture of interest.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1110 (5th ed. 1979).
9. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404
(1958) [hereinafter cited as The Aims of Criminal Law]; van den Haag, Punishment as a
Device for Controlling the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706 (1981).
10. Hart, Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-
11 (1967). See also Andenaes, supra note 7, at 957.
11. The essential distinction between a criminal and a civil wrong lies in the effects of
each and in the remedies provided by law for same. See Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law
and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967, 969 (1943); P. WINFIELD, PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF
TORT 11-13 (1931). A crime is an offense against the public at large, KENNY, OUTLINES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 1 (16th ed. 1952), and criminal liability is imposed to protect those interests
common to the public at large. WINFIELD,, supra at 13. The State, as the representative of the
public, brings action in the form of criminal prosecution in order to punish the criminal wrong-
doer. W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (5th ed. 1984). The purpose of
criminal liability is to protect and vindicate the interests of society as a whole. Id. The civil
one respect, what distinguishes criminal liability and its penalties
from that of civil liability is the judgment of community condemna-
tion which accompanies it."2 However, to the individual subjected to
severe criminal sanctions, it is the actual sufferance thereof which
marks the distinction from civil responsibility more so than the social
stigma. 13
Criminal punishment is thus a device by which society attempts
to achieve many goals.1 Most commentators agree that to be an ef-
fective means to this end, criminal sanctions must serve at least one
of the two18 classic purposes16 of punishment, namely, retribution
and deterrence.1 7 Retribution 8  involves the imposition of punish-
tort, on the other hand, is a harm done to an individual. Id. The tort action is thus commenced
by the victim for the compensation of that victim, rather than by and for the public. WIN-
FIELD, supra at 13. The primary purpose of the civil action is to compensate the victim for
damages incurred. PROSSER & KEATON, supra at 7.
12. The Aims of Criminal Law, supra note 9, at 404. Hart ventures that it is precisely
this judgment of community condemnation which justifies the imposition of criminal liability.
13. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant professed that the criminal must consent
to his punishment. He reasoned that the criminal person, as a rational being, must wish to
suffer the punishment he must recognize as deserved for having violated society's sense of
justice. I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW. It has been suggested that Kant replaces what
criminal offenders actually think, feel, intend and are motivated by with what they would
think if they reasoned correctly. See van den Haag, supra note 9, at 714.
14. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 7, at 21; van den Haag, supra note 9, at 706.
See also Vidmar & Miller, Social Psychological Processes Underlying Attitudes Toward Le-
gal Punishment, 14 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 565 (1980) (Deterrence is only one of the many
goals that punishment serves in society. "Punishment also defines social boundaries, vindicates
norms, and provides an outlet for the psychological tensions aroused by deviant acts.")
15. Criminal punishment in theory can serve many purposes. The imposition of crimi-
nal punishment serves a general preventive purpose. Andenaes, supra note 7. The suffering of
the criminal as punishment for his crime deters him, as well as others in society, from commit-
ting crimes in the future. Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 226 (1959). The infliction of criminal punishment also serves an educational and morali-
zation function by demonstrating to the public what conduct will or will not be tolerated, thus
shaping and reinforcing moral beliefs. Wertheimer, Criminal Justice and Public Policy: Sta-
tistical Lives and Prisoners' Dilemmas, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 730, 735 (1981). The retribu-
tionist would impose criminal sanctions upon an offender to satisfy a demand of the public,
e.g., to obtain revenge against that person who has caused it harm. See infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text. Punishment in the form of incarceration serves to protect the public from
persons deemed dangerous because of their past criminal conduct. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 7, at 22. Cf. J. HALL & S. GLUECK, CRIMINAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 17 (2d ed.
1958) (isolation and incarceration serve no real purpose without rehabilitation because most
prisoners are returned to society). Finally, some criminal sanctions do effect a rehabilitative
result. In essence, the criminal is "punished" with appropriate treatment designed to rehabili-
tate him. The object is to return him to society so reformed that he will not wish or need to
commit crimes in the future. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra at 23. The rehabilitation goal is
premised on a belief that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes which can be
identified and upon which basic therapeutic measures can be undertaken to effect changes in
that behavior. Id.
16. The purposes of punishment can be distinguished from its justifications. Justifica-
tion involves a deeper analysis of purpose in that it entails a morally acceptable purpose. As
such, it does not define punishment, but rather defines a morally defensible punishment.
17. Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1667 (1980). J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1947). See generally van den
Haag, supra note 9; Vidmar & Miller, supra note 14.
18. "Something given or demanded in payment. In criminal law, it is punishment based
on the theory which bears its name and based strictly on the fact that every crime demands
ment because it is deserved,19 because it is fitting that one who has
caused harm, consciously to some degree, should suffer for his ac-
tions.'0 In effect, the retributive purpose of punishment is one which
satisfies a popular demand2 1 and which enables a society to obtain
revenge'2 against a wrongdoer for the harm it has suffered as a re-
sult of that individual's chosen actions.13 Deterrence,' 4 on the other
hand, involves the imposition of criminal punishment for the purpose
of preventing future crime, through an effect on both the individual
offender'2 and other potential offenders 6 in a society.
In order to serve the basic purposes of retribution and deter-
rence, the severity of a penalty must correlate with the gravity of
harm marked by a certain offense and the degree of criminal culpa-
bility contemplated by that offense.27 In other words, in order to
payment in the form of punishment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1184 (5th ed. 1979). For a
detailed statement of the retributivist theory see Gahringer, Punishment and Responsibility,
65 J. PHIL. 291 (1969). See also Comment, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punish-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Constitutional Defini-
tion of Punishment] (retribution generally defined as revenge for past violations of the law).
19. Clearly this theory justifies distribution of punishment only to the actually guilty.
See van den Haag, supra note 9, at 707.
20. Allen, supra note 15, at 226.
21. Murder and Its Punishment supra note 7, at 449. See also Vidmar & Miller, supra
note 14, at 565. [The authors offer a detailed analysis of the socio-psychological dynamics of
punishment reactions to criminal offenders and break down punishment motives into two types:
behavior control and retribution. The article focuses on the targets of these motives, i.e., the
offender and the broader social audience.]
22. Comment, Constitutional Definition of Punishment, supra note 18, at 1679. But
see Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 630 (1938)
[attacking this form of retaliation as immoral and intolerable].
23. Again, this theory addresses punishment only to those actually guilty of committing
a crime. The retributionist has great difficulty justifying criminal punishment of unintended or
negligent acts.
24. Deterrence, the goal or purpose of which is to prevent the occurrence of future
crime, is a subcategory of utilitarianism, a theory which rests on the basis that the purpose of
punitive sanctions is to effectuate some future goal. Traditionally, a sharp division exists be-
tween retributivist and utilitarian philosophers. The former are concerned with the moral justi-
fication for punishment, while the latter treat the protection and welfare of society as the
justification of punishment. Murder and its Punishment supra note 7, at 447; Constitutional
Definition of Punishment, supra note 18, at 1679.
25. Criminal punishment has a profound effect on many past offenders. Some "go
straight" in order to avoid further punishment. Others commit fewer or less serious crimes.
Criminal punishment also serves to shape and reinforce the offender's moral beliefs. Addition-
ally, the imposition of punishment may have an absolute, even if temporary, deterrent effect on
an individual, in that during a period of incarceration the individual offender is incapacitated
and prevented from committing further crimes against outsiders. Wertheimer, Criminal Jus-
tice and Public Policy, Statistical Lives and Prisoners' Dilemmas, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 730,
734-735 (1981).
26. The imposition, or even threat of imposition, of legal punishment deters other mem-
bers of society from committing crimes by extorting obedience to the law through fear of
punishment for failure to obey. Id.
27. Some theorists purport that the deterrence theory warrants punishment beyond that
deserved because it fails to capture the limits of justified punishment in its emphasis of the
prevention of future crime by an offender and others. See Goldman, Beyond the Deterrence
Theory: Comments on van den Haag's "Punishment as a Device for Controlling the Crime
Rate", 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 721 (1981).
justly and efficiently effectuate the goals of society, criminal punish-
ment must be based not only on the harm which results from an
offender's actions, but also on the accused's awareness of the crimi-
nal nature of his conduct. 8
III. History of the Crime of Homicide by Vehicle in Pennsylvania
In 1977 Pennsylvania amended its motor vehicle code with the
dual purposes of reducing highway traffic accidents and eliminating
resultant administrative delays due in large part to vehicle operators
proceeding under varied and obsolete rules of driver conduct. 9 At
that time, the crime of homicide by vehicle was established in Penn-
sylvania.80 Under section 3732 of the vehicle code, a person engaged
in any traffic violation which causes the death of another is guilty of
homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, and is sub-
ject to the corresponding penalties of imprisonment and fine." 1
Prior to the enactment of the homicide by vehicle statute, the
vehicle code contained no similar provision. Instead, the state in-
voked the charge of involuntary manslaughter under the Pennsylva-
nia Crimes Code82 to punish violations of the vehicle code or munici-
pal traffic ordinances that resulted in death. Because a conviction
under the involuntary manslaughter provision requires a finding of
recklessness, or at a minimum gross negligence, the mere violation of
a traffic law was often insufficient to support a conviction under that
28. van den Haag, supra note 9, at 711. See von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resus-
citated: The American Bar Association's Second Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS
L. REv. 772 (1981). Von Hirsch states that:
Punishment is the solemn act of ascribing blame. Its severity should comport
with the blameworthiness of the defendant's criminal conduct. To achieve a
more just system, one should stop basing decisions about punishment on what it
is thought the offender (or other potential offenders) will do in the future. In-
stead, one should seek to make penalties commensurate with the gravity of the
defendant's criminal conduct.
See also Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa. Super. 282, 291, 419 A.2d 457, 465 (1980)
("[I]n order for punishment to be efficacious and just . . . it must be predicated on the ac-
cused's awareness of the factors which make his conduct criminal.").
29. See E. MORRIS & I. PACKEL, RULES OF THE ROAD 1 (1974).
30. Pennsylvania's homicide by vehicle statute has its origin in the Uniform Vehicle
Code's provision for homicide by vehicle, Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-903(a) (rev. ed. 1968),
which provides:
Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of another while
engaged in the violation of any state law or municipal ordinance applying to the
operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of
homicide when such violation is the proximate cause of death.
31. A person convicted of a first degree misdemeanor may be imprisoned for up to five
years, or fined up to $10,000, or both. See 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 1101, 1104 (1982).
32. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504 (1982). This section defines involuntary manslaughter
as follows:
A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the
doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing
of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of
another, Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
statute.33 Prosecutors found it difficult to persuade juries to convict
the negligent motorist of manslaughter. In apparent recognition of
this limited utility of the involuntary manslaughter statute in coping
with the vehicular homicide problem, coupled with a desire to reduce
fatalities on the highways, a" the Pennsylvania legislature established
the crime of homicide by vehicle. Amended in 1982 so that a sepa-
rate and distinct offense for the crime of homicide by vehicle while
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance s
could be established, section 3732 presently reads as follows:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another per-
son while engaged in the violation of any law of this Common-
wealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use
of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3732
(relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled sub-
stance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the
first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.8s
Thus the legislature provided for the expansion of criminal lia-
bility for traffic violations resulting in death by relaxing the degree
of proof of two of the elements of involuntary manslaughter: culpa-
ble conduct and causation. 7
33. See Commonwealth v. Clowser, 212 Pa. Super. 208, 239 A.2d 870 (1968). In
Clowser, the superior court refused to sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter even
though the defendant's failure to yield the right-of-way to an oncoming favored motorist re-
sulted in the death of that motorist. The court held that a vehicle code violation without a
finding of wanton or reckless conduct is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter. See also Commonwealth v. Trainor, 252 Pa. Super. 332, 381 A.2d 944 (1977);
Commonwealth v. Sisca, 245 Pa. Super. 125, 369 A.2d 325 (1976); Commonwealth v. Greer,
232 Pa. Super. 448, 335 A.2d 770 (1975).
34. See E. MORRIS & I. PACKEL, RULES OF THE ROAD 1 (1974); Kearney, Pennsylva-
nia's Obsolete Traffic Laws, 44 PA. B.A.Q. 561 (1973).
35. That new section was 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3735 (1984) which provides as follows:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as a direct
result of the violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of
alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3731 is
guilty of a felony of the third degree when the violation is the cause of death and
the sentencing court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of impris-
onment of not less than three years.
The legislative comments indicate that Mothers Against Drunk Drivers was an effective impe-
tus in the passage of this piece of legislation. See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, LEGIS-
LATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Session of 1982, No. 53, at 1700 (September
29, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Wambach).
36. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732.
37. Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437 A.2d 385 (1981). The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania explained the relationship between involuntary manslaughter and homicide by
vehicle. The court noted that the expansion in liability was accomplished "not by an elimina-
tion of any of the elements of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, but by a relaxation of
the degree of proof of two existing elements: culpable conduct and causation." Id. at 347-48,
437 A.2d at 387. Involuntary manslaughter requires proof that a defendant violated a provi-
sion of the vehicle code in a reckless or grossly negligent manner and that death was a direct
result of his conduct. By contrast, homicide by vehicle requires proof only that a defendant
knew or should have known that he engaged in conduct claimed to be in violation of the
vehicle code and that death was, at the very least, a probable consequence of that conduct. Id.
However, in providing this method for achieving society's legiti-
mate goal of reducing traffic fatalities, the legislature created a stat-
ute overflowing with problems of interpretation and construction.
One noticeable flaw in the statute is that it establishes no specific
degree of causation as a necessary element of the crime.38 Perhaps
even more noticeably, and assuredly more perplexingly, the homicide
by vehicle statute does not prescribe any particular degree of fault or
mens rea as an element of the crime.3' Rather, it appears that the
only requirement for the imposition of criminal liability is some
causal connection between the violation of a motor vehicle code pro-
vision or municipal traffic ordinance and the death of another. 0
Not surprisingly, courts began to struggle with these problems,
and thus with the meaning and constitutionality of section 3732,
soon after its enactment. Several constitutional attacks were ad-
vanced against the statute including those based on vagueness,"1
strict criminal liability,42 equal protection,4 3 and cruel and unusual
punishment." Additionally, several courts addressed the causation
issue45 because of the silence of section 3732 with regard to the de-
gree of causation necessary for a vehicular homicide conviction. A
brief overview of these arguments provides the necessary background
for the principal analysis section to follow.
One of the earliest but unsuccessful attacks on the statute
charged that the penalties attached to the homicide by vehicle stat-
ute are cruel and unusual and overly harsh." Courts have rejected
this argument and have refused to declare the statute unconstitu-
tional on this basis. In doing so, the courts have relied on the legisla-
38. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732.
39. This interpretation can be attributed to the phrase "in the violation of any law." 75
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732 (emphasis added). Had the legislature chosen to narrow the applica-
tion of the statute to only those violations involving a degree of recklessness or negligence, this
strict liability issue may never have surfaced.
40. See Commonwealth v. Richardson. 307 Pa. Super. 191, 452 A.2d 1379 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Spurgeon, 285 Pa. Super. 563, 428 A.2d 189 (1981); Commonwealth v.
Hartzell, 282 Pa. Super. 549, 423 A.2d 381 (1980); Commonwealth v. Kisbaugh, II Pa. D. &
C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979).
41. E.g., Commonwealth v. Burt, 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 89 (1980); Commonwealth v.
Koch, 297 Pa. Super. 350, 443 A.2d 1157 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kisbaugh, II Pa. D. &
C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979).
42. E.g., Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Barone, 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980); Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa. Super.
350, 443 A.2d 1157 (1982); Commonwealth v. Pavlocak, 299 Pa. Super. 439, 445 A.2d 834
(1982).
43. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dis-
missed, 104 S. Ct. 1260 (1984).
44. E.g., Commonwealth v. Gotto, 306 Pa. Super. 434, 452 A.2d 803 (1982); Common-
wealth v. Beams, 299 Pa. Super. 582, 445 A.2d 220 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kisbaugh, 11
Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979).
45. E.g., Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980); Commonwealth
v. Gibson, 329 Pa. Super. 626, 478 A.2d 94 (1984).
46. E.g.., Commonwealth v. Beams, 299 Pa. Super. 582, 445 A.2d 220 (1982).
tive power to establish criminal penalties4 7 and to temper punish-
ment at the time of sentencing.4' The superior court finally dismissed
this contention in Commonwealth v. Gotto49 in 1982.
It must be noted, however, that in prescribing the penalties for
homicide by vehicle, the legislature made no distinction between
those penalties and the penalties imposed by the involuntary man-
slaughter statute.50 If a lesser degree of culpability is required for
conviction under the homicide by vehicle statute than that which is
required for an involuntary manslaughter conviction, the overly
harsh punishment argument is not completely without merit.
51
An equal protection issue has also been raised without success.52
This argument rested on the premise that although the conduct and
state of mind of two individual offenders of the motor vehicle code
may be identical, the sanctions imposed upon those individuals may
not be identical whenever a death is the result of only one of those
violations. Courts presented with this argument have concluded that
the classifications drawn by the statute are rationally related to a
proper state purpose,5 8 and thus enactment of the statute was a con-
stitutional exercise of lawmaking powers by the legislature."
47. Commonwealth v. Kisbaugh, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 146; Commonwealth v. Sloat, 92
York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
48. Commonwealth v. Beams, 299 Pa. Super. 582, 445 A.2d 220 (1982).
49. 306 Pa. Super. 434, 452 A.2d 803 (1982). Accord Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.
Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985).
50. Compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504, supra note 32 with 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3732, supra note 36 and accompanying text. Both crimes are classified as misdemeanors of the
first degree and carry penalties of imprisonment for up to five years, or a possible fine of up to
$10,000, or both. Ironically, a conviction under section 3732 also results in the suspension of
an offender's operating license under 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1532 (1982), whereas a conviction
under the involuntary manslaughter section carries no similar penalty.
51. For purposes of this comment, the argument's strength or weakness lies in the de-
gree of culpability actually required for conviction under the statute. If a finding of no culpa-
bility or mere simple negligence will sustain a conviction under the statute, then indeed the
punishment may seem cruel and unusual. If however, recklessness or gross negligence is re-
quired, the argument loses much of its strength. Because the precise degree of culpability
necessary to sustain a conviction has not been clearly established, no final evaluation of the
argument is made.
52. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983).
53. The court in Hicks noted that the test of the validity of a statutory classification
which does not implicate "fundamental interests" or affect with particularity a "suspect class"
is whether the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at
344, 466 A.2d at 615.
54. For a brief analysis of several equal protection issues raised by the possibility of
utilizing a mere negligence standard as the basis for conviction under the homicide by vehicle
statute see Mancke, Homicide By Vehicle in Pennsylvania: A Question of Meaning and Con-
stitutionality, 85 DICK. L. REv. 391, 400-401 (1981). Mancke raises the issue of whether the
Commonwealth would be prescribing different conduct standards depending on whether an
individual is a motorist or non-motorist. A non-motorist would need to be found guilty under
the involuntary manslaughter statute, that is, guilty of recklessness or gross negligence, in
order to be guilty of a first degree misdemeanor, when his actions resulted in death. On the
other hand, a motorist need only be found to have acted negligently in violation of the vehicle
code in order to be convicted of a first degree misdemeanor. Mancke points out that if the
statute were interpreted to require no culpability for conviction, but only a causal connection
The arguments which have received the bulk of judicial atten-
tion are those based on vagueness and strict criminal liability. Fol-
lowing the attempts of several lower courts55 to interpret the mean-
ing of section 3732, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Burt" held that the statute was not violative of
due process for being vague and indefinite. In this decision, the
court's first opportunity to address the meaning and constitutionality
of the homicide by vehicle statute, the court established only that the
statute was not unconstitutionally vague in that it required proof
that a traffic violation was the cause of death. The court failed to
discuss both the degree of causation necessary for conviction and the
general constitutionality of the section.
The final and most controversial issue surrounding the homicide
by vehicle statute is whether or not it imposes strict penal liability.58
In an attempt to resolve the conflicting decisions rendered by lower
courts on this issue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court conclusively
established in Commonwealth v. Field" that the homicide by vehicle
statute does not impose strict criminal liability. The court concluded
that the crime of homicide by vehicle as defined in section 3732
does, in fact, contemplate a culpability requirement in that the sec-
tion requires proof that the accused deviated from the standard of
care established by the underlying vehicle code or municipal ordi-
nance provision allegedly violated."0 Accordingly, the issue of culpa-
bility requires a determination of whether the accused "knew, or
should have known, that he engaged in conduct claimed to be in
violation of that section." 1
In effect, the supreme court established a "reasonable man"
between a violation and death, the equal protection argument becomes even more troublesome.
55. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa. Super. 549, 423 A.2d 381 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Kisbaugh, II Pa. D. & C.3d 146 (C.P. Lehigh County 1979); Commonwealth v.
Sloat, 92 York L. Rep. 180 (Pa. C.P. 1979).
56. 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 89 (1980).
57. The court stated:
With unmistaken clarity, section 3732 defines "homicide by vehicle" as a death
caused by any person's conduct violating law or municipal ordinance applying to
vehicular or traffic regulation. This section does not employ 'ambiguous words,'
'archaic classifications,' or words with 'numerous and varied' meanings ....
Accordingly, any vagueness challenge must be rejected.
Commonwealth v. Burt at 178, 415 A,.2d at 92.
58. This issue and the related issue of the necessary degree of culpability are the basis
for the primary analysis section of this comment.
59. 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
60. Id. at 524, 417 A.2d at 163. This requirement of culpability does not actually ap-
pear anywhere in the statute, but was judicially imposed to save the section from constitutional
attack. Mancke, supra note 54, at 398.
61. Field, at 525, 417 A.2d at 163 (1980). In Field the underlying Vehicle Code viola-
tion consisted of driving on a sidewalk, 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3703 (1984). Thus proof was
required that a "reasonable driver could . . know" that a sidewalk existed where the defend-
ant was driving when his vehicle struck the victim. Id.
standard as the test of culpability for vehicular homicide in order to
save the statute from the constitutional objection that it was
designed to impose liability without fault.62 The concurring63 and
dissenting" opinions of the Field decision, however, indicate that
there is some disagreement between the members of that court as to
the constitutionality of the statute. Additionally, the court disposed
of the causation issue with its finding that conviction under the stat-
ute requires that death was, at the very least, a probable conse-
quence of the defendant's violation."
The court in Field held that because the crime of homicide by
vehicle as defined in section 3732 contemplates an element of fault,
the statute could not be constitutionally challenged as imposing strict
criminal liability. However, subsequent decisions have indicated that
the "reasonable man" standard established for judging vehicular
homicide cases differs little, if at all, from the standard of reasona-
bleness governing negligence claims in civil damage suits. The con-
stitutionality of this interpretation, that of imposing criminal liability
for vehicular homicide on a showing of simple or ordinary negli-
gence, was not raised in Field and the court did not discuss it. Thus
the question of precisely what degree of culpability66 is required for
a vehicular homicide conviction was left open, and the courts have
continued to struggle with this question while rendering conflicting
results. 7 Furthermore, the separate question remains whether any of
62. Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 187, 491 A.2d 212, 216 (1985).
63: In his concurring opinion, Justice Flaherty joined with the majority in construing
section 3732 to require culpable conduct as a necessary element of the crime. Field, at 525-26,
417 A.2d at 163 (Flaherty, J., concurring).
64. Then Chief Justice Eagen dissented on the ground that the section allows convic-
tion and imprisonment in the absence of culpable conduct and is therefore unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Eagen relied on the findings in Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa. Super. 282,
419 A.2d 457 (1980). 490 Pa. at 526, 417 A.2d at 163 (Eagen, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 525, 417 A.2d at 163.
66. Section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302 (1982),
recognizes four degrees of culpable conduct, i.e., acting intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently. These culpability requirements would apply to the homicide by vehicle statute
unless it were determined that the section imposes liability without regard to fault. To obtain a
conviction for homicide by vehicle under § 302(b)(4) on the basis of negligence, proof would
be needed that the defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the required stan-
dard of care. Proof of simple or ordinary negligence would be insufficient to establish criminal
negligence. Thus it is apparent that the standard set forth by the supreme court does not
establish that the defendant must be criminally negligent, as defined above, to be convicted of
homicide by vehicle. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. The question remains
whether culpable or simple negligence actually was contemplated by the legislature or by the
court.
67. See Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985) (proof of
ordinary negligence is sufficient to support a conviction under § 3732 but such a conviction
unconstitutionally violates due process rights). Commonwealth v. Spurgeon, 285 Pa. Super.
563, 428 A.2d 189 (1981) (section 3732 creates a strict liability offense without regard to any
scienter element and does not require a showing of reckless or negligent culpability); Common-
wealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa. Super. 549, 423 A.2d 381 (1981) (section 3732 does not require a
showing of culpability as defined in section 302 of the Crimes Code). Commonwealth v. Nay,
these subsequent interpretations and applications could conceivably
pass constitutional due process muster.
Until the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is again faced with
the opportunity to establish the precise level of culpability required
to sustain a conviction under the homicide by vehicle statute, courts
will undoubtedly continue to render conflicting opinions on this issue.
The following analysis section elaborates on these conflicting inter-
pretations and analyzes them in light of the purposes of punishment
and the societal goals they purport to serve. 68 Finally, suggestions
are offered as to how society's needs can best be served through the
application of a homicide by vehicle statute.
IV. Analysis: Section 3732 and the Achievement of Goals
The elements of the crime of homicide by vehicle, defined in
section 3732, have been judicially determined as follows:
(1) The defendant deviated from the standard of care estab-
lished by the underlying vehicle code provision or municipal or-
dinance.(2) The defendant knew, or should have known, that he
engaged in the conduct claimed to be in violation of the underly-
ing vehicle code provision or municipal ordinance.(3) A death
occurred.(4) The death was, at the very least, a probable conse-
quence of the defendant's violation of the underlying vehicle
code provision or municipal ordinance. 9
Basically, these elements present, as the test of culpability, a
"reasonable man" standard based upon a determination of whether
the defendant knew, or should have known, that he engaged in the
traffic violation.7 0 Courts have offered varied interpretations regard-
ing the precise degree of culpability actually necessary to sustain a
conviction under the statute71 and whether a conviction based on
that level of culpability would be constitutional.7 2 Each of these in-
terpretations results in a separate and distinct level of achievement
of the purposes of criminal punishment, and thus, in a separate and
distinct degree of fulfillment of society's goal of traffic fatality
reduction.
281 Pa. Super. 226, 421 A.2d 1231 (1980) (section 3732 does require a showing of culpable
negligence as defined by section 302 of the Crimes Code).
68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69. Commonwealth v. Field at 525, 417 A.2d at 163; Commonwealth v. Houtz at 348-
49, 437 A.2d at 387; Commonwealth v. Heck, at 190, 491 A.2d at 216; Commonwealth v.
Koch at 356, 443 A.2d at 1160.
70. Commonwealth v. Heck at 190, 491 A.2d at 216.
71. See cases cited supra note 67.
72. Id.
A. Strict Criminal Liability: The Legislative Intent
Did the Pennsylvania legislature actually intend that every vio-
lation of a vehicle code provision or municipal traffic ordinance that
resulted in death, no matter how unintentional, would be punished
with a charge of vehicular homicide? The history of the statute sug-
gests conflicting intentions.
Pennsylvania's homicide by vehicle provision has its origin in
the Uniform Vehicle Code,7 3 Section 11-903(a), which provides as
follows:
Whoever shall unlawfully and unintentionally cause the death of
another person while engaged in the violation of any state law or
municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle
or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of homicide when
such violation is the proximate cause of death.
74
Until 1962, the Uniform Vehicle Code described the crime as
"negligent homicide," which required proof of a reckless disregard
for the safety of others.7 5 Currently, the Uniform Vehicle Code's ve-
hicular homicide statute requires only a causally connected violation
of a vehicular law.7 6 A substantial majority of the states which have
enacted similar statutes, however, have included a requirement that
the offender's conduct be reckless." This history of the provision in
other states may indicate that the Pennsylvania legislature deliber-
ately chose to premise criminal responsibility solely upon a traffic
violation. Indisputably, the language of the Pennsylvania statute sug-
gests no requirement that recklessness or even negligence is a fault
element of the crime.
7 8
Although section 3732 was but one undebated section7 9 of a
73. The Uniform Vehicle Code is published by the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances. The Committee is composed of a select group of representatives
of federal, state and local government units, insurance companies, motor clubs, safety councils,
national transportation associations and other individuals and groups interested in the promo-
tion of sound, uniform motor vehicle laws and regulations. The Committee operates through a
number of reports and studies conducted by experts on the various subjects covered. It has
promoted the adoption of a separate vehicle code provision concerning vehicular homicide in
order to notify drivers of the applicability of homicide statutes to them. 5 NATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, No. 7, STATES LAWS ON HOMICIDE By
VEHICLE 1, 2, 14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMITTEE].
74. UNIF. VEHICLE CODE § 11-903(a) (1968).
75. UNIF. VEHICLE CODE § 11-903(a) (1956 version) provided:
When the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of
injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of
others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.
76. UNIF. VEHICLE CODE § 11-903(a) (1968).
77. See generally NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDI-
NANCES, TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED § 11-903 (1972 and Supp. 1976); 74 AM. JUR.2d, Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 304-44 (1980); Annot., A.L.R.3d 473 (1968).
78. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3732.
79. There was extensive debate on many of the specific changes made in the vehicle
massive piece of legislation enacted as the amended motor vehicle
code,80 the strict liability implications of the statute could not have
passed through the legislature without notice. Section 3732 did not
merely slip through as an unadulterated version of the Uniform Ve-
hicle Code's vehicular homicide statute. In the course of enactment,
the Pennsylvania Legislature deleted the terms "unlawfully" and
"proximate" from the model version and added the phrase "a misde-
meanor of the first degree.""a
In several cases under section 3732, the Commonwealth has ar-
gued, 2 at least once successfully, that the words of the statute
clearly and unambiguously provide for a strict criminal liability
without regard to any scienter element."' The argument continued
that the statute unequivocally evidences a legislative intent to impose
severe penal sanctions of up to five years imprisonment, and a possi-
ble fine, on drivers who, no matter how unintentionally, cause a
death while operating a vehicle in violation of any vehicle code provi-
sion or municipal ordinance regulating the use or operation' of a
vehicle.
It must be noted that had the legislature intended to impose
liability under the section only upon reckless or criminally negligent
defendants, it really need not have enacted the statute at all. Obvi-
ously those defendants were already subject to prosecution for invol-
untary manslaughter under the Crimes Code.84 Upon these facts,
keeping in mind the limited utility of the involuntary manslaughter
statute in prosecuting many fatality-causing traffic violations, it is
not inconceivable that the Pennsylvania Legislature did intend to im-
pose criminal liability upon every such violation, no matter how un-
intentional or unavoidable.
However, because of the common law tradition against the im-
position of strict penal liability,8 courts are hesitant to interpret leg-
islation as imposing strict criminal liability unless a legislative intent
to do so "plainly appears." 6 Essentially, in the principles of Ameri-
can criminal jurisprudence, the existence of mens rea is the rule
code. Unfortunately, section 3732 specifically received little attention.
80. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 101-9910 (1984).
81. Compare UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-903(a) with 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732.
82. Commonwealth v. Spurgeon, 285 Pa. Super. 563, 428 A.2d 189 (1981); Common-
wealth v. Barone, 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
83. Commonwealth v. Spurgeon, 285 Pa. Super. 563, 428 A.2d 189 (1981).
84. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504.
85. See generally Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, Sup. CT. REV. 107, 109
(1962); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROES. 401 (1958); Stal-
lybrass, The Eclipse of Mens Rea, 52 L.Q.R. 60 (1936). See also J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 327-31 (2d ed. 1960); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 81 (3d ed. 1969);
G. WILLIAMS. CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART §§ 70-76 (2d ed. 1961). See generally
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-260 (1952).
86. Commonwealth v. Barone at 290-91, 419 A.2d at 462.
rather than the exception.8 Accordingly, judicial interpretations of
section 3732 generally establish that the section does not impose
criminal liability without regard to fault.88 A legislative intent to im-
pose such liability, as tempered by the circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the statute, does not "plainly appear. '89
An evaluation of this interpretation that section 3732 does not
contemplate the imposition of strict penal liability begins with a re-
view of section 302 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,90 which sets
forth minimum culpability requirements when mens rea is an ele-
ment of an offense as follows:
Except as provided in Section 305 of the title (relating to limita-
tions on scope of culpability requirements), a person is not guilty
of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each ma-
terial element of the offense.9'
In determining whether these culpability requirements are ap-
plicable to any of the material elements of a section 3732 offense,
the analysis logically turns to section 305 of the Crimes Code9
2
which generally governs the scope of section 302. Section 305 pro-
vides, inter alia, that:
(a) The requirements of culpability prescribed by Section 302 of
this title . . . do not apply to...
(2) offenses defined by statutes other than the title, in-
sofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability
for such offenses or with respect to any material ele-
ment thereof plainly appears.98
At first glance then, it appears that the culpability requirements of
section 302 should be applicable to homicide by vehicle.
The argument against a legislative desire to impose strict crimi-
nal liability has run in many directions, and it was always premised
on the contention that a legislative intent to do so does not "plainly
appear." In Commonwealth v. Barone,9 4 the superior court scruti-
87. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1950), cited with approval in Com-
monwealth v. Barone at 302, 419 A.2d at 468.
88. Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980); Commonwealth v.
Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985); Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa. Super. 350,
443 A.2d 1157 (1982); Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437 A.2d 385 (1981).
89. See supra note 88.
90. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302 (1982).
91. Id.
92. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305 (1982).
93. Id. Section 305 is basically identical to Section 205(l)(b) of the Model Penal Code.
The comments to section 205 note that the "section makes a frontal attack on absolute or
strict liability in penal law, whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence imprison-
ment." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05, comment 1 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1953).
94. 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
nized the legislature's use of the critical word "homicide" in the title
of the offense. 95 The court noted that Pennsylvania courts have con-
sistently and uniformly interpreted homicidal statutes as requiring
that the voluntary act which caused the death be done with some
degree of fault, i.e., intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently.96 Taken in context, the court found the word "unintention-
ally" 97 to mean plainly that the conduct which caused the death was
not done with purpose or design, and not that the usual understand-
ing of the word "homicide" had been negated.98 The court concluded
that the section could not be read in such an unambiguous manner
so as to preclude a conclusion that a violation underlying the homi-
cide by vehicle charge must still be at least negligent.99 Thus the
statute could be read as either evidencing a legislative intent to im-
pose strict or absolute penal liability or to criminally prosecute only
negligent violations. 100
Conceding the circumstances surrounding the enactment of sec-
tion 3732, including the inadequacy of the involuntary manslaughter
statute in prosecuting negligent violations of the traffic laws resulting
in death, 101 the court still found that the legislature did not intend to
impose liability without fault, but rather intended to establish an of-
fense somewhere between the crime of involuntary manslaughter and
a strict liability offense. The supreme court subsequently agreed.
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B. Strict Criminal Liability: The Achievement of Societal Goals
Although the courts in Field and Barone completed the task of
interpreting whether section 3732 was designed to impose liability
without regard to fault, the question remains whether the statute al-
lows the imposition of such liability under any circumstances. In-
deed, at least one court since Field has decided that it does impose
95. Id. at 291, 419 A.2d at 462. The court rationalized this approach as comporting
with three general principles of statutory construction, namely:
(1) When the legislature employs language which is plain and unambiguous,
there is no longer justification to resort to the rules of statutory construction;(2)
In deciding whether a word or phrase in plain and unambiguous within the
meaning of the above principle, an appellate court is to construe the word or
phrase in accordance with its common and approved usage and;(3) If our legisla-
ture has utilized a word or phrase which is centuries old in our common law
jurisprudence, we must interpret it consistently with its heritage in our legal
traditions.
96. Id. Accord 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 (1982) (defining criminal homicide in the
context of intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causing the death of another).
97. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3732.
98. Commonwealth v. Barone at 292, 419 A.2d at 463.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra text accompanying note 34.
102. See Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
such liability.' 0 8 However, the application of criminal liability in this
situation without regard to fault does not relate to the achievement
of society's goal of traffic fatality reduction. An analysis of this con-
tention serves as the starting point for analysis of criminal punish-
ment of the negligent driver.
Recall that the primary legislative intent in revising the entire
motor vehicle code was to eliminate highway accidents and to pro-
vide for uniformity in traffic laws.1 4 The specific reasons behind the
legislature's decision to enact a distinct offense governing vehicular
homicide lay in a desire to reduce fatalities on the highways and to
correct the conviction problems inherent in involuntary manslaughter
prosecutions.10 5 However, in order to meet these societal goals, it is
necessary that punishment for homicide by vehicle be predicated on
an assumption that the offender was aware of the criminality of his
conduct. 0 6 Furthermore, the punishment imposed, or even threat
thereof, will only be truly efficacious when it correlates to the level of
culpability contemplated by the offense.' 0 7 Where these basic princi-
ples of criminal law are not met, the sanctions imposed by a criminal
law serve no punitive purpose and do little, if any, good towards the
achievement of the goals of the law. 0 8
The analysis begins with the fundamental concept of criminal
law which requires that before an individual can be criminally pun-
ished, a criminal state of mind must co-exist simultaneously with the
performance of his forbidden act.' 09 The term "criminal state of
mind" (mens rea) refers to a state of mental awareness, such as an
intention to do an immediate act or bring about a consequence, or a
reckless disregard as to such act or consequence." 0 Punishment
without regard to fault strays from this fundamental criminal con-
cept because it involves no consideration of state of mind. Thus the
question arises as to what societal good could possibly be achieved as
a result of criminally punishing vehicular code violations which re-
sult in death on a strictly liability basis.
Underlying the homicide by vehicle statute, and every criminal
statute, is the notion that punishment is necessary to reform or teach
the accused not to repeat the offense and to deter others from imitat-
103. See Commonwealth v. Spurgeon, 285 Pa. Super. 563, 428 A.2d 189 (1981).
104. See supra text accompanying note 29.
105. See supra text accompanying note 34.
106. Commonwealth v. Barone at 295-96, 419 A.2d at 465.
107. See von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Associa-
tion's Second Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 772 (1981).
108. See id.
109. Comment, Is Criminal Negligence a Defensible Basis for Penal Liability?, 16 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 749 (1967).
110. Id.
ing him. If the goal of this particular statute is to protect society
from inappropriate and careless driver conduct, then what purpose
can be served by punishing an operator who has acted reasonably
and prudently under the circumstances?111 Surely the deterrence
theory of punishment is not served by imposing criminal sanctions
without regard to fault on drivers who cause the death of another
while in violation of the vehicle code. Deterrence requires proportion-
ing penalties to culpability. 112 Threats of criminal punishment do not
deter drivers who commit such offenses without fault,113 i.e., without
intent, knowledge, recklessness or negligence. Traffic or vehicular vi-
olations committed without culpability are incapable of being de-
terred, for it is obvious that the offender cannot purposely avoid
them. 1 Hence the deterrent theory of criminal law is an effective
means of reducing vehicular homicides only when addressed to the
culpable driver.11'
Furthermore, retribution does not justify the imposition of crim-
inal punishment for homicide by vehicle upon a strict liability basis.
The retributivist theory of criminal law imposes punishment because
it is deserved.11 The theory presupposes a type of "moral guilt"
which justifies society's gratification of feelings of revenge against
those who have caused it to suffer.117 However, the imposition of
such punishment cannot be justified without a finding of mens rea." 8
The legitimacy of criminal condemnation is predicated on some type
of personal accountability based on an offender's conscious willing-
ness to violate a law." 9 The motor vehicle operator who has caused
the death of another through the unavoidable violation of a vehicle
law has not committed any morally reprehensible act. His conduct
does not even approach the moral delinquency against which society
could justifiably seek revenge.
Furthermore, to allow an offender to be punished with no refer-
ence to his state of mind simply does not make sense. If, with refer-
ence to the driver's evaluation and perception of his immediate cir-
cumstances, his conduct conforms to what is reasonable and prudent
1I 1. Commonwealth v. Barone at 292, 419 A.2d at 464.
112. von Hirsch, supra note 28. See also Murder and Its Punishment, supra note 7, at
437.
113. See van den Haag, Punishment As a Device For Controlling the Crime Rate, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 706, 711 (1981).
114. See id.
115. For an interesting analysis of how the legal system operates inefficaciously by pun-
ishing most severely those persons and crimes that are least deterrable and punishing least
severely those persons and crimes that are most deterrable, see Chambliss, Types of Deviance
and the Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703 (1967).
116. van den Haag, supra note 113.
117. Id. See also Comment, supra note 109, at 751.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 comment 4 (1980).
119. Id.
and socially acceptable under similar circumstances, this conduct
cannot mark this particular driver as one who needs and deserves to
suffer punishment. 120 No good possibly can be served by criminally
punishing such an operator or separating him from his family and
society. 2' Every driver has probably unwillingly, unknowingly, and
unconsciously violated some traffic law at some time in his life. Pun-
ishment for this type of violation serves no proper penal purpose.122
Finally, threats and the imposition of punishment must be pro-
portioned to criminal culpability. 28 If deliberately reckless, or even
negligent violations of vehicle laws are not punished more than una-
voidable offenses, there is no reason for drivers to refrain from delib-
erately or recklessly violating traffic laws to injure another when one
is held strictly criminally responsible for not avoiding that same re-
sult.12 4 It is not inconceivable that traffic fatalities could become
more frequent. Accordingly, even if the homicide by vehicle statute
does allow for the imposition of criminal punishment on a strict lia-
bility basis, such punishment would not only be a possible violation
of due process rights' 25 but would also be a useless attempt to reach
society's goal of reducing the incidence of traffic fatalities.
In conclusion, criminal punishment of vehicle code violations
which result in death, without regard to the fault or state of mind of
the driver, cannot meet the purposes of criminal punishment and
thus cannot meet the societal goal of traffic fatality reduction. Not
only is punishment of unintended, non-negligent violations unrelated
to the culpability of the offending driver, such punishment also does
not serve the retributive or deterrent theories of criminal punish-
120. Conduct which is reasonable and prudent under similar circumstances will usually
not even justify the imposition of civil sanctions on the private side of the law. It cannot possi-
bly justify the imposition of the more far-reaching sanctions of criminal law.
121. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 1
WORKING PAPERS (1979) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS]. The Commission notes:
The justification for imposing criminal liability where there is no fault has been
that enforcement of society's demands requires it . . . . If a person's conduct
has been truly without fault, however, the threat of punishment will not favora-
bly affect his conduct. The imposition of punishment is not needed to "reform"
or "rehabilitate" him; no fault requiring correction has been identified. Punish-
ment, if it takes the form of detention, will prevent him from engaging in the
conduct while he is detained. It may also satisfy the community's (irrational)
demand for retribution for the harm which the conduct caused.
These slight functions which can be served are manifestly inadequate justifi-
cations for criminal liability without fault. Preventive detention of the kind in-
volved here has no place in the criminal law. It is unlikely that the community
will feel strongly about offenses of this kind.
Id. at 219.
122. See Commonwealth v. Barone at 327, 419 A.2d at 481.
123. van den Haag, supra note 113, at 712.
124. See id. at 713. (If every crime is threatened with the most severe punishment, no
deterrence exists.)
125. See Commonwealth v. Barone at 332-33, 419 A.2d at 483-84.
ment. The moral claim of the retributionist as to why punishment
should be imposed 26 on a driver, regardless of his state of mind,
cannot be truly justified. While some victims' families may experi-
ence feelings of satisfaction and gratification of the need for revenge
against the driver who caused the loss of a loved one, 2 7 society in
general could not morally justify the imposition of severe criminal
sanctions upon a driver totally free from moral blameworthiness. 2 8
Furthermore, a resort to the deterrence theory, which commits one
to a factual inquiry as to the effects of punishment upon the driver
and upon society,"29 reveals no reason to impose punishment upon a
driver without regard to fault.3 0 A reduction in the number of fatal-
ities on our highways does not result "' because that goal cannot be
reached where the prime purposes of criminal law and punishment
are not first met.
C. Simple Negligence: The Legislative Intent
It seems apparent that the elements defining the crime of homi-
cide by vehicle, as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia,' 3  contemplate nothing more than an ordinary negligence3 8
standard as the basis for liability under the statute. The supreme
court has not ruled directly on the exact degree of culpability re-
quired for a conviction under section 3732. The superior court has
addressed the issue on several occasions,3 4 rendering conflicting
126. See WORKING PAPERS supra note 121.
127. See id. See also Hart, supra note 7, at 448.
128. See WORKING PAPERS supra note 121.
129. See Murder and Its Punishment supra note 7, at 448.
130. The imposition of a prison sentence for a strict liability crime has been condemned
as "irrational," WORKING PAPERS, supra note 121, and "incompatible with the basic require-
ments of our Anglo-American, or any civilized jurisprudence," Wasserstrom, Strict Liability
In the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 730 (1960).
131. This is not to say that the imposition of strict criminal liability can never serve a
legitimate goal of society. In some instances, e.g., public welfare offenses, the infliction of such
punishment can easily be justified. See Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d
825 (1959). However, as the Model Penal Code suggests, absolute or strict liability should
never be imposed where an offense carries a possible sentence of imprisonment, MODEL PENAL
CODE, supra note 93, which the homicide by vehicle statute undoubtedly contemplates. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that to imprison an offender for any-
thing other than a true crime is a violation of due process, a true crime being defined as one
involving both "moral delinquency" and "personal causation." Commonwealth v. Koczwara at
585, 155 A.2d at 830.
132. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
133. Negligence has been defined as "the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a reasonable or prudent man would not do." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 930 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
134. See Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985); Common-
wealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa. Super. 482, 450 A.2d 29 (1982); Commonwealth v. Nay, 281 Pa.
Super. 226, 421 A.2d 1231 (1980); Commonwealth v. Barone, 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d
457 (1980).
results.
In Commonwealth v. Barone,13 decided prior to the supreme
court's decision in Field,'86 and in the subsequently decided case of
Commonwealth v. Nay,1 87 the court concluded that culpable negli-
gence was the legislatively intended touchstone for punishment under
the homicide by vehicle statute. The court held that only violations
in which there has been a "gross deviation" from the required stan-
dard of care may be punished under the homicide by vehicle stat-
ute."" Thus the intention of the legislature to punish only "grossly"
negligent violations comports with the definition of criminal negli-
gence in section 302189 of the Crimes Code, which requires a gross
deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would ob-
serve in the actor's situation.
However, in Commonwealth v. Setsodi,1" that same superior
court disavowed its decision in Barone" and held that the degree of
culpability required by section 3732 is less than that of criminal neg-
ligence. Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Heck,"' the superior
court held that proof of ordinary negligence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction under the vehicular homicide law. 148 It is apparent that
the members of the superior court are at odds as to the precise level
of culpability necessary for conviction for vehicular homicide. As of
the latest superior court decision144 handed down on this issue, proof
of ordinary negligence, of a mere deviance from conduct of the rea-
sonable person, will suffice to convict under the homicide by vehicle
statute.
There are facts which indicate that the legislature did not in-
tend to impose criminal liability for homicide by vehicle upon a
showing of only simple or ordinary negligence. The strongest indica-
tor is that in amending the vehicle code in 1977, the legislature de-
clined to adopt a new crime of careless driving. " 5 A proposal was
placed before the House to retain the crime of reckless driving" 6 and
also to create a new crime of careless driving based on an ordinary
135. 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
136. 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
137. 281 Pa. Super. 226, 421 A.2d 1231 (1980).
138. Commonwealth v. Nay at 232, 421 A.2d at 1234; Commonwealth v. Barone at
297, 419 A.2d at 465.
139. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(b)(4) (1982).
140. 303 Pa. Super. 482, 450 A.2d 29 (1982).
141. 276 Pa. Super. 282, 419 A.2d 457 (1980).
142. 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985).
143. The court found evidence of ordinary negligence sufficient to sustain a conviction
under 3732, but held that such conviction was an unconstitutional deprivation of due process
rights.
144. Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985).
145. See Commonwealth v. Barone at 316-17, 419 A.2d at 475.
146. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3714 (1984).
negligence standard. After extensive debate, 1 7 the section was de-
feated. Significantly, there appeared to be some discussion that to
impose criminal liability upon a finding of ordinary negligence would
be unfair to those citizens who operated motor vehicles in good
faith 148 yet accidentally violated vehicle code provisions.
Thus, it could be argued that because the history of the
amended vehicle code manifests a reluctance on the part of the legis-
lature to subject reputable citizens to a criminal penalty for mere
carelessness, then that same legislature could not have desired to
subject those same citizens to a misdemeanor charge carrying a pos-
sible prison sentence for conduct characterized as merely careless.
This line of reasoning, although not without merit, ignores one basic
notion underlying the enactment of the homicide by vehicle statute,
namely, the unwillingness of juries to convict negligent fatality-caus-
ing traffic offenders under the involuntary manslaughter which re-
quires, at a minimum, a finding of recklessness or gross negli-
gence.' 49 The argument logically follows that if a conviction could
readily be obtained for reckless or grossly negligent violations of the
vehicle code under that section,15° the legislature must have intended
to expand the scope of liability under involuntary manslaughter to
include those persons who negligently violated traffic laws.
151
147. The amendment to remove the section creating the new crime from House Bill No.
1817 went through three separate votes. With respect to the creation of the new crime, Repre-
sentative Eckensperger stated:
Now may I respectfully submit to the members of this House that we do
not need to create a new crime identified as careless driving. It shocks my con-
science that we should say that it henceforth will be a crime if you drive care-
lessly. Now that amounts to ordinary negligence. Can you imagine the number
of cases that would flow though a magistrate's office if we were to identify ordi-
nary negligence as a crime? It would proliferate the number of cases, clog up the
courts unnecessarily. We are doing well now without it ....
Mr. Bonetto suggests that careless drivers should not be on the highway. I
suggest to you that at some point in time every one of us has been careless in the
manner of operating a vehicle - not intentionally so, depending, of course, on
how you interpret the word "careless" - and that he and the rest of us would
probably not be on the highway, as well as the rest of the general public, if we
are going to say that every careless act should be a crime. I am not advocating
that carelessness should not be accounted for. We have the civil courts that take
care of the careless operation of vehicles.
LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE 4072-73, quoted in Commonwealth v. Barone at 316-17, 419
A.,2d at 475-76.
148. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE at 4160.
149. See Commonwealth v. Barone at 317, 419 A.2d at 476.
150. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504 (1982).
151. Commonwealth v. Barone at 321-22, 419 A.2d at 478. Indeed this is not an im-
plausible conclusion. In North Carolina, just such an intent was attributed to that state's legis-
lature by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. The court stated:
The number of deaths resulting from the operation of motor vehicles on the
highways has increased to an alarming extent. Indictment for the common law
crime of manslaughter has proved ineffective as a means of repressing the negli-
gence in motor vehicle operation causing death upon the public thoroughfares.
The motorist is generally a reputable citizen, and the wrong committed by him
A possible counter-argument to this line of reasoning is that the
legislature merely intended to create the crime of homicide by vehi-
cle in order to forewarn motor vehicle operators of the applicability
of homicide statutes to them.152 However, if the legislature had in-
tended to do so, and thus limit violations under section 3732 to reck-
less or grossly negligent defendants, it certainly could have included
language to that effect in defining the new crime of homicide by
vehicle.158
It appears from the definition of the elements of homicide by
vehicle as set forth by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 54 from
the decisions rendered by courts 55 following the definition set forth
in Field, and from certain circumstances surrounding the enactment
of section 3732,156 that homicide by vehicle in Pennsylvania is based
on ordinary negligence. A mere deviation from reasonable conduct
suffices to sustain a conviction under the homicide by vehicle statute.
Criminal negligence, as defined by the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 
1 7
where an offender's failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable
risk is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor's situation, is not a requisite to
conviction. Vehicular homicide in Pennsylvania is founded on simple
negligence.
D. Simple Negligence: The Achievement of Societal Goals
Setting aside any constitutional problems with the use of a neg-
ligence standard in homicide by vehicle convictions, how does this
level of culpability relate to the satisfaction of the goal of traffic fa-
tality reduction? The analysis again begins with an evaluation of
how well the imposition of criminal punishment for this kind of con-
duct serves the classic purposes of punishment, retribution and
deterrence.
Retributive punishment requires mens rea. The retributionist
which brings someone to his death is most often an unintentional violation of a
prohibitory statute or ordinance, unaccompanied by recklessness or possible con-
sequence of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision.
Thus it is apparent that the intention of the legislature in enacting [homicide by
vehicle] was to define a crime of lesser degree of manslaughter wherein criminal
responsibility for death by vehicle is not dependent upon the presence of culpable
or criminal negligence.
State v. Freeman, 31 N.C. App. 93, 97, 228 S.E.2d 516, 519 (1976). quoted in Common-
wealth v. Barone at 321, 419 A.2d at 478.
152. See, NATIONAL COMMITTEE supra note 73.
153. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3732.
154. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
155. Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa. Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (1985); Common-
wealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa. Super. 482, 450 A.2d 29 (1982).
156. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
157. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(b)(4).
looks to see if punishment is deserved, and if that question is an-
swered in the affirmative, then punishment is imposed in order to
satisfy the demands of society.8 8 However, the retributionist has
great difficulty in justifying punishment of unintended, i.e., negligent
acts,' and it has been urged that inadvertent negligence is not a
sufficient basis for criminal conviction.160
The imposition of the severe sanctions available under the homi-
cide by vehicle statute upon the ordinary negligent operator has been
characterized as "unreasonable," 1 1 and such unreasonableness is
demonstrated by distinguishing the vast difference between negligent
and conscious wrongdoing. "The precise culpability level depends
upon whether the actor intends a risk as the consequence of his ac-
tions, or knows the risk will be created by his actions, or is aware of
the likelihood of the risk but chooses to disregard it,"' 2 or is una-
ware of the risk of which he should be aware. In a fundamental
sense, the severity of criminal punishment can only be morally justi-
fied, can only be legitimatized, when an offender's wrongdoing in-
volves a willingness to consciously violate clearly established societal
norms. 68
The driver who does not perceive the risks associated with his
conduct presents a moral situation substantially different from that
of the driver who knows exactly what he is doing and what risks he
is running and who nevertheless makes a conscious choice to con-
tinue with that line of conduct.'" The negligent driver, by definition,
has not consciously committed some morally deplorable act, but
rather has merely made an error in judgment. This type of error is
an everyday occurrence on the road, even though it may deviate
from a reasonable standard of care. The retributionist cannot justifi-
ably mark this type of negligent driver as one who deserves to be
criminally punished.
The victim of the inadvertent operator's action is not left totally
without recourse; he may still recover damages for negligence under
the civil law. Monetary recovery for the economic costs of injuries
from the one responsible for those injuries may never fully compen-
sate for the loss of a loved one. However, where a burning desire for
revenge exists only on the part of a victim's survivors, to subject the
merely negligent operator to the additional punitive sanctions of the
158. Murder and Its Punishment, supra note 7, at 447-49; van den Haag, supra note
113, at 711.
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160. See MODEL PENAL CODE supra note 118, at 90.
161. See Commonwealth v. Heck at 185, 491 A.2d at 223.
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criminal law can serve no rational purpose of that law.16 Thus, the
retributionist would refer negligent violations of the vehicle code
which result in death to the civil side of the law, where the sanctions
imposed would be more commensurate with the degree of fault. 166
Neither can the imposition of criminal liability and punishment
upon a finding of mere negligence serve the deterrent purpose of
criminal law, even though this theory of punishment may justify
punishment of negligence more readily than retribution." 7 The legis-
lative decision to criminalize negligent operation of a vehicle when it
happens to result in a death does not make a true criminal of a
merely negligent driver. It is likely that every motor vehicle operator
has driven carelessly at some time in his life. Surely such a driver
never intends to take a life. To make his negligence, compensable on
the civil side of the law, criminal based solely on an unexpected out-
come can have little, if any, deterrent effect on the incidence of neg-
ligent driving.168 As noted by the court in Commonwealth v. Heck:
A driver engaged in the negligent but unknowing commission of
a traffic offense does not reflect at all on the possibility of killing
someone; and it is almost absurd to suggest that he would drive
more carefully if he knew it was a serious criminal offense to kill
someone while driving negligently.169
But if criminal punishment will not prevent future negligent vio-
lations by an offender, what recourse does society have to assure that
such an offense will not be repeated? One observation unmistakenly
pinpoints the source of such assurance:
Our finest citizens drive on the highways and are, at times,
guilty of traffic infractions. When such an infraction results in
the death of another, a jail sentence is not needed for them to
realize their wrong. They did not mean to kill the first time, and
the resulting mental torture from feeling they took another's life
will more than insure that their driving habits will be corrected
in the future.170
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Not only would criminal punishment of negligent violations fail
to effect a deterrent result upon the individual offender, it would also
fail to effect such a result on other members of society. The utilita-
rian urges that ordinary negligence is an insufficient basis on which
to premise criminal punishment because threatened sanctions cannot
influence the inadvertent offender. Such an offender, by definition, is
incapable of perceiving the risks of his conduct, and therefore cannot
be deterred from risk.
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Furthermore, deterrence, no less than justice, demands propor-
tioning of criminal penalties according to culpability. 17' Here, a con-
viction under the homicide by vehicle statute would require a show-
ing only of simple or ordinary negligence. A conviction under the
involuntary manslaughter statute, which can also be invoked to pros-
ecute violations of the vehicle code that result in death, would re-
quire a showing of recklessness, or at a minimum gross negligence.
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However, the criminal sanctions available under both of these stat-
utes are identical, a maximum possible jail sentence of five years and
a maximum possible fine of $10,000.1'
Hence, a crime involving a lesser degree of fault, that of homi-
cide by vehicle, is threatened with the same punishment as one in-
volving a greater degree of fault. Since the less culpable can be pun-
ished as much as the more culpable, no one will be deterred from
becoming more culpable. The negligent person has no law to deter
him from grossly negligent or reckless conduct. The goal of society,
deterrence of negligently caused traffic fatalities, is not achieved. In
fact, such a situation could have an adverse impact on the achieve-
ment of that goal for the would-be negligent driver knows he could
act even recklessly without incurring a greater penalty.
Society's goal is served little, if at all, by the criminal punish-
ment of ordinarily negligent traffic violations which result in death.
The imposition of such punishment effectively serves no purpose of
criminal law.' 7 5 Whatever slight benefits could be obtained cannot
justify the severe penalties of criminal condemnation.1 6 To subject a
defendant, free from guilty mind, to the imposition of a prison sen-
tence is "revolting to the community sense of justice.
17 7
793, 812-13 (1962).
171. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 118.
172, van den Haag, supra note 113, at 712.
173. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2504.
174. Both crimes are classified as a first degree misdemeanor. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1104 provides the punishment for this type of misdemeanor.
175. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 121.
176. Id.
177. Id.
E. Criminal Negligence: The Legislative Intent
Criminal negligence is defined as follows:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of
an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of
his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable per-
son would observe in the actor's situation. 78
Thus a driver acts with criminal negligence when he fails to per-
ceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct will result
in the violation of a vehicle code provision, and his failure to so per-
ceive that risk can be characterized as a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable driver would exert in that same
situation. On this basis, if the violation results in death, and criminal
negligence were the proper basis for conviction, that driver could be
punished for homicide by vehicle.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, however, there is little evi-
dence that the Pennsylvania legislature intended to designate crimi-
nally negligent violations as the basis for vehicular homicide convic-
tions.1"9 Most obviously, if the legislature desired to punish only
those types of violations which resulted in death, it need not have
established the crime of homicide by vehicle at all. Grossly negligent
violations of the vehicle code which resulted in a death were already
subject to prosecution under the involuntary manslaughter provision
of the Crimes Code 80 at the time the legislature chose to enact the
vehicular homicide statute. As judicial decisions have pointed out,' 8'
the legislature must have intended to establish a crime which would
be capable of sustaining convictions which the involuntary man-
slaughter statute was incapable of sustaining, those involving a cul-
pability less than that of criminal negligence. 83 Indeed, the elements
of homicide by vehicle, as established by the Supreme Court, 8 a indi-
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cate that the crime of vehicular homicide contemplates conviction
upon a showing not of criminal negligence, but ordinary negligence.
F. Criminal Negligence: The Achievement of Societal Goals
Could punishment of the criminally negligent driver achieve the
goals of society any more efficiently than punishment of the ordina-
rily negligent driver? Some theorists would no doubt claim that it
could not. By definition, even the criminally negligent driver has not
consciously chosen to ignore some substantial and unjustifiable
risk.1" Like the ordinary negligent driver, he has made an error in
judgment, albeit a gross one. Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend
how retribution, which demands punishment on the basis of a guilty
state of mind, 185 could require that such mistakes be punished crimi-
nally. Likewise, the deterrence theory, based on the assumption that
the offender who knows he will be punished for any criminal activity
will adjust his behavior to avoid a criminal act,1' does not readily
justify criminal punishment of the criminally negligent driver. It is
questionable whether holding the criminally negligent driver crimi-
nally liable for his actions, the risks of which he has failed to per-
ceive, will deter him from failing to perceive in the future.
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The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that punishment of
the criminally negligent driver would not further any of the purposes
of punishment; therefore, there is no rational basis for the imposition
of punishment on him.'88 However, it cannot be denied that criminal
negligence, by definition, can stand as the basis for criminal punish-
ment.' 8' Furthermore, a standard stricter than criminal negligence
would duplicate the involuntary manslaughter statute that the legis-
lature had sought to supplement with the separate crime of homicide
by vehicle.
Faced with the choice between strict liability, negligence, and
gross negligence, it seems that the most fair and efficient means of
reaching society's goal of reduction in traffic fatalities would be to
employ criminal negligence as the standard for vehicular homicide
convictions. However, in view of the distinction between the blame-
worthiness of reckless violations and the blameworthiness of negli-
gent violations, namely, an absence of conscious wrongdoing in the
184. The driver who consciously disregards substantial and unjustifiable risk is charac-
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latter,190 it would seem appropriate that a distinction be made in the
punishment imposed for those types of violations. Under the homi-
cide by vehicle statute a criminally negligent driver who caused the
death of another would be punished just as severely as a reckless
driver who caused the death of another would be punished under the
involuntary manslaughter statute.1 1 Keeping in mind the reluctance
of juries to convict for involuntary manslaughter on a showing of
negligence,19 2 a reduction in the penalties for vehicular homicide
should be made available. Thus the penalties imposed by each of the
offenders would be more commensurate with the level of culpability
contemplated by each offense.
IV. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion indicates that ordinary negligence is
within the purview of the statute imposing criminal liability for
homicide by vehicle in Pennsylvania. However, a theoretical analysis
demonstrates that punishment of the ordinarily negligent driver
whose conduct results in the death of another serves no proper penal
purpose and thus serves no legitimate goal of society. Homicide by
vehicle, a serious crime with serious penalties, should be based at the
very least upon a showing of criminal negligence. Even in the em-
ployment of a criminal negligence standard, there are changes which
need to be made in the Pennsylvania statute. Most importantly, the
penalties imposed should be reduced in order to have those penalties
correlate to the blameworthiness of the offender. Only then can the
legitimate goal of society, that of a reduction in fatalities on the
highways, be justly and efficaciously served. Pennsylvania needs to
adopt a more realistic and rational approach to solving the problem
of negligently caused fatalities on our highways.
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